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ABSTRACT
The responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine allows the international community to intervene for
humanitarian purposes in events of massive violations of human rights. However, the legality of
humanitarian intervention has received considerable critical attention because of its direct
conflict with two fundamental norms in international law: the prohibition of the use of force,
except under certain conditions, and the principle of state sovereignty. In Syria, mass atrocity
crimes are escalating on a daily basis. Until now, international efforts have failed to find a
peaceful formula to stop the crisis. International law allows the Security Council to authorize
humanitarian intervention under the power of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
Politically, however, the Security Council is deadlocked. This study applied the three pillars of
the R2P to the Syrian case and found that Syria is indeed an R2P case. Moreover, the research
considers the legality of humanitarian intervention versus its legitimacy. It concludes that
humanitarian intervention is illegal or, at best, its legality is ambiguous. The research stresses the
need to re-evaluate the international legal norms to respond to overwhelming humanitarian
necessity. The research then analyses different scholarly opinions to study the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention and suggests that the international community has the right to protect
Syrian citizens based on their moral duty. The thesis studies the political interests of the different
strategic stakeholders in the Syrian situation and concludes that due to the lack of international
interest, intervention is unlikely to materialize, and Syrians must look toward conflict resolution
and reconciliation between the warring parties in order to rebuild Syria.

KEY WORDS
Syrian crisis; responsibility to protect (R2P); humanitarian intervention; international law;
strategic and political situation
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Summary
In March 2011, the world witnessed the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. Many Syrians
protested to topple the authoritarian rule of the governing Al-Assad regime and to replace it with
the rule of law and justice. Many Syrians began a peaceful revolt and demanded reforms in the
country, such as the freedom of opinion and expression, but the arrogance of the ruling regime
and the tyranny of power prevented any positive response to those demands. The government
intensified its crackdown on protestors and denied the people’s demands, and as a result, the
peaceful revolution transformed into an armed rebellion. Even yet, in May 2014, Syrians have
not achieved victory over the tyrannical government. In fact, the situation in the country
transformed from a revolution into a battle among the different warring parties.
The current humanitarian situation is dismal, mass atrocities are being committed by the
warring parties,1 and according to figures collected by international organizations in May 2014,
there have been an estimated 162,402 casualties and approximately one third of Syrians are
refugees in different countries around the world. The Syrian government has failed to abide by a
peace agreement brokered by the United Nations and the Arab League.2 In such circumstances,
one might expect an external intervention to stop the ongoing crisis and protect human rights, but
for many reasons, some legal and others political, the international community has not been able
1 UNHRC, Preliminary report of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, 17th Sess, UN Doc
A/HRC/17/CRP.1 (June 2011) para 5, online:
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.CRP.1_Englishonly.pdf> [mimeo] [UN HRC, “Rights in Syrian Arab
Republic”].
2 “Syria: Army Shoots Protesters Attempting to Reach Observers”, Human Rights Watch News Centre (12 January 2012),
online:<http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/11/syria-army-shoots-protesters-attempting-reach-observers>.
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to effectively intervene to assist the Syrian people. This thesis questions the responsibility of the
international community to protect Syrian citizens. It examines if Syria is a responsibility to
protect (R2P) case and then analyses the legality of humanitarian intervention versus its
legitimacy.
The R2P doctrine is an emerging norm in international law,3 and was established in
response to the grave genocides in recent history, such as in Kosovo and Rwanda.4 In 2000, Kofi
Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, challenged the international community by
asking: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human
rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?”5 Accordingly, the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established in September 2000
and presented its report that recommends the R2P doctrine. Thomas Weiss explains that, with
few exceptions, “no idea has moved faster or farther in the international normative arena than the
Responsibility to Protect.”6

The doctrine states that: (1) “[t]he State carries the primary

responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;”7 (2) “[t]he international community has a
responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;”8 and (3) “if a State

3 UNGA, Note by the Secretary-General, 59th Sess, UN Doc A/59/565 at para 203 (December 2004), online:, <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/602/31/PDF/N0460231.pdf?OpenElement> [mimeo] [UNGA, “Note by the Secretary-General”].
4 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on
Intervention

and

State

Sovereignty

(Ottawa,

ON:

International

Development

Research

Centre,

2001)

at

VII,

online:

<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf> [ICISS].
5 UNGA, We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century: Report of the Secretary General, 54th Sess, UN Doc
A/54/2000 (March 2000), online: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/54/2000> [mimeo].
6 Thomas G Weiss, “R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit” (2006) 24 Wis Intl LJ 741 at 741 [Weiss]..
7 United Nations, The Responsibility to Protect, online: Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml> [UN “The R2P”].
8 Ibid.
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is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to
take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.”9 This action may necessitate the use of force for humanitarian purposes, which is
often called humanitarian intervention.10
Scholars are divided in their opinions around the doctrine of the responsibility to protect.
David Chandler admits that R2P shifts toward “a pragmatic response to changes in Realpolitik as
it is a response based on concern for the world’s victims.”11 Alternatively, for Noam Chomsky,
R2P is a justification for the West’s interests in intervention, and says: “‘new interventionism’ is
replaying an old record.”12 Gareth Evans, from another point of view, poses the question of what
are the options when helpless citizens are suffering. If “prevention fails, conflict breaks out
within a state, and mass atrocity crimes are occurring or imminent, it is not an option for the
world to stand by and do nothing.”13
Moreover, humanitarian intervention is in conflict with two fundamental principles in
international law: the prohibition of use of force and the principle of state sovereignty.
According to Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force is prohibited:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the treat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.14
9 Ibid.
10 JL Holzgrefe & Robert O Keohane, eds, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas at 18. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003) [Holzgrefe & Keohane].
11 David Chandler, “The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the ‘Liberal Peace’” (2004) 11:1 Intl Peacekeeping 59. at 72 [Chandler].
12

Noam

Chomsky,

“Lessons

from

Kosovo”,

Chomsky.Info:

The

Noam

Chomsky

Website,

online:

Books

<http://

www.chomsky.info/books/humanism01.htm>, excerpted from Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism (Monroe, ME: Common Courage
Press, 1999).
13 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once And For All (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2008) at 100 [Evans, “Ending Mass Atrocity”].
14 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 [UN Charter]. In the R2P context, see e.g. Simon Chesterman, Just War or
Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 47 [Chesterman].
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International law, however, includes two exceptions on the preceding ban. The first exception is
in the case of self-defence, which falls under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and
the second exception falls under the Security Council authorization defined in Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. Humanitarian intervention is not one of these exceptions and for that reason
scholars have argued its legality.15 Simon Chesterman explains that “[o]n reading Article 2(4), it
is not immediately clear whether the phrase ‘against the territorial integrity or political
independence’ is intended to qualify the words ‘threat or use of force’ … [as] it might be argued
that this is the only type of force that is to be prohibited.”16 Therefore, Chesterman argues
“reference to the travaux preparatoires17 makes it clear, however, that there was no intention for
the words to restrict the scope of the prohibition of the use of force.” 18 The words were added, as
per Chesterman, “in response to the desire of several smaller states to emphasize the protection
of territorial integrity and political independence.”19 From the other point of view, Christopher
Greenwood, a judge in the ICJ, draws our attention to the main purpose behind the establishment
of the UN Charter, claiming that:
[I]international law is not confined to treaty texts. It includes customary
international law. That law is not static but develops through a process of State
practice, of actions and the reaction to those actions. Since 1945, that process has
seen a growing importance attached to the preservation or human rights. Where the
threat of human rights has been of extreme character, States have been prepared to
assert a right of humanitarian intervention as a matter of last resort.20

15 Petra Perisic, “Legal Permissibility of Unilateral Humanitarian Interventions” (2013) 9:1 Acta Universitatis Danubius. Juridica 38 at 41
[Perisic].
16 Chesterman, supra note 14 at 48.
17 “the initial draft of the Charter of the United Nations”, see e.g. Perisic, supra note 15 at 41.
18 Chesterman, supra note 14 at 49.
19 Ibid.
20 Christopher Greenwood, “Humanitarian Intervention: the Case of Kosovo” in Jarna Petman & Martti Koskenniemi, eds, Finnish Yearbook of
International Law (The Hague, the Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 141 at 162, online: <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21492/>
[Greenwood].
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Moreover, state sovereignty is protected in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United
Nations.21 “On the international level, sovereignty means independence, i.e., non-interference by
external powers in the internal affairs of another state. International norms are based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of independent states; international law excludes interference
and establishes universally-accepted rules.”22 However, some scholars consider sovereignty as a
defense to protect tyrannical governments. Martti Koskenniemi views sovereignty as an
“organized hypocrisy,” and argues “sovereignty ought not to shield tyrannical governments. We
respect it if it brings us valuable objectives—security, welfare, human rights.”23
As an attempt to legalise humanitarian intervention, some scholars, just like Sir
Greenwood, have alleged that states’ previous systematic practices in relation to humanitarian
intervention could be considered as a norm in customary international law, therefore a reason to
legalise it. However, A.O. Enabulele debates that the repetition of the illegal intervention cannot
make it legal.24 Moreover, some scholars have argued that human rights and morality have
superiority over the law and, accordingly, consider that humanitarian intervention is legitimate.
One such scholar is Michael Walzer, who justifies humanitarian intervention, saying that:
Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable
expectations of success) to acts “that shock the moral conscience of mankind.” The
old-fashioned language seems to me exactly right. It is not the conscience of
political leaders that one refers to in such cases. They have other things to worry
about and may well be required to repress their normal feelings of indignation and
outrage. The reference is to the moral convictions of ordinary men and women,
acquired in the course of everyday activities. And given that one can make a
persuasive argument in terms of those convictions, I don’t think that there is any
21 UN Charter. In the R2P context, see e.g. Chesterman, supra note 14 at 91.
22 Alain de Benoist, “What is Sovereignty?” (1999) 1999:116 Telos 99 at 100, online:<http://telospressonline.com/content/
1999/116/99.short>.
23 Martti Koskenniemi, “What Use for Sovereignty Today?” (2011) 1:1 Asian J of Intl L 61 at 61, 63 [Koskenniemi].
24 A.O. Enabulele, “Humanitarian intervention and territorial sovereignty: the dilemma of two strange bedfellows” (2010) 14:3 Intl JHR 407 at
414 [Enabulele].
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moral reason to adopt that posture of passivity that might be called waiting for the
UN (waiting for the universal state, waiting for the messiah).25

Ultimately, politics is at the core of international interventions; hence, intervention does
not materialize in Syria. This thesis analyzes the international strategic and political situation in
relation to the Syrian situation. The thesis concludes by stressing on the need to replace the
existing norms in international law with unified norms that do not include a pick-and-choose
process, and to create a law that can respond to people’s suffering and respect their humanity.

Structure of the Thesis
The overall structure takes the form of five chapters, including the introductory Chapter
1. In Chapter 2, the situation in Syria is investigated. An overview explains how the revolution
started. What was the motive? How did the revolution transform into a ‘civil war’? In addition,
the humanitarian situation is explained using actual numbers and facts from several reports from
international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and the United Nations Human Rights Office.
There are many cases in Syria that demonstrate the ongoing crimes of mass atrocities, but
this research selects two of the most prominent ones that convinced the international community
to report the crimes in Syria to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These two cases are “the
use of chemical weapons in Damascus”26 and the “evidence of ‘industrial-scale killing’ by the

25 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed (New York: Basic Books, 2006) at xxiii, cited
in Anne Orford, “Moral Internationalism and the Responsibility to Protect” (2013) 24:1 Eur J Intl L 83 at 97 [Walzer].
26 UNGA–UNSC, Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic
on the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013, UNGA 67th Sess, UN Doc A/67/997–S/2013/553,
September 2013, online: <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/553> [mimeo] [UNGA, “Use of Chemical Weapons”].
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Syrian regime.”27 These cases led me to explore the reaction of the international community to
these crimes. The international community made a number of attempts to solve the Syrian crisis,
for example, the four Security Council draft resolutions, the Geneva Peace Plan, as well as many
other measures that have failed to resolve the Syrian crisis.
Chapter 3 introduces the R2P doctrine. I review the 2001 ICISS report, and its further
amendments. The term “mass atrocity crimes” is briefly defined to facilitate understanding of the
Syrian situation and my arguments. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty asserts that the responsibility to protect means not only the “responsibility
to react,” but also the “responsibility to prevent” and the “responsibility to rebuild.”28 I discuss
both the reactive and the preventive measures, and apply them to the research case to find out
what measures have been taken in Syria by the international community. The failure of the
preventive measures will give way to more coercive measures, such as the use of force.29 Hence,
I present the criteria that were suggested by ICISS, which have to be satisfied prior to any
military intervention. Finally, I investigate if Syria is an R2P situation, and I apply the three
pillars suggested by Mr Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to do so.30
The Chapter finds that R2P is applicable in the Syrian case. Accordingly, the international
community have the responsibility to protect Syrian citizens, based on the R2P doctrine.

27 “A Report into the credibility of certain evidence with regard to Torture and Execution of Persons Incarcerated by the current Syrian regime”,
prepared for Carter-Ruck and Co. Solicitors of London, published by The Guardian (20 January 2011), online:
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2014/jan/20/torture-of-persons-under-current-syrian-regime-report> [credibility of certain
evidence].
28 ICISS, supra note 4 at 17.
29 Ibid.
30 UNGA, Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc A/63/677, January 2009 at para 6, online:
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/63/677> [mimeo] [UNGA, “Implementing R2P”].
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In light of the previous conclusion, Chapter 4 argues that humanitarian intervention could
break the deadlock and resolve the Syrian crisis. However, humanitarian intervention is in
conflict with two well-established principles in international law. I define humanitarian
intervention, to distinguish between humanitarian intervention and traditional military
intervention, and then I define the components that constitute international law in order to
facilitate the discussions around the subject, for example, the position of customary law in
international law. Afterwards, I study the legal position of humanitarian intervention in
international law. However, the chapter is designed to determine whether an intervention can be
justified in Syria based on its moral duty to protect the violation of fundamental human rights;
accordingly, scholars’ opinions are discussed. I conclude by suggesting that the international
community has the right to protect Syrian citizens.
In Chapter 5, I explore the fact that the international community is divided regarding
what constitutes the best action in relation to the Syrian situation. I discuss the interests of the
three main strategic actors in the Syrian case: Russia, China, and the US. The first two are
discussed because they used their veto power four times to preclude the resolutions from being
passed in the Security Council. The US is discussed because of its threats to operate a military
intervention against the Syrian regime following the catastrophic chemical weapons incident.
The Chapter explored that there was always an intervention in Syria regardless of its direct
military form.31
Finally, I conclude with some thoughts that, in order for the Charter of the United
Nations to survive, some norms have to be developed to effectively respond to new changes in
the international arena, I further add a few words from my personal experience, and some
31 Michael Ignatieff, “How to Save the Syrians” (13 September 2013), The New York Review of Books: NYR (blog), online:
<http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/sep/13/how-save-syrians/> [Ignatieff].
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recommendations to Syrians to rebuild their own country based upon the revolutionary principles
of freedom, equality, and dignity.

Methodology
The research was conducted based on primary and secondary sources. It used international
law as a primary source, as well as the Charter of the United Nations, and international
conventions and agreements, to explore the position of humanitarian intervention in international
law. The research also conducted an in-depth analysis of the secondary sources in a review of the
relevant literature of legal and political science scholars. The research considered the ICISS
reports, and the relevant instruments in international law, reports to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, and documents from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and United
Nations Human Rights Office.

Scope of Work
The research is categorized as public international law, which is the main jurisdiction. The
research discusses the R2P doctrine, its emergence and development, but did not study the
responsibility to rebuild, which usually relates to a wide range of issues, such as good
governance, justice and reconciliation, economic and social science, and the role of the
rebuilding commission. The research gives an overview of the humanitarian intervention after
1945, the birth of the Charter of the United Nations, but it does not discuss the roots of
humanitarian intervention before that date. Moreover, the research discusses a very timely and
important issue that affects international peace and security. This research covers the Syrian
situation, starting from the emergence of the revolution in February 2011 until May 2014.

Personal Motivation

9

I have tried to be as objective as I could while writing this thesis; however, I would like
to share some of my personal experiences. When the revolution started at the beginning of 2011,
I was one of many Syrians who were optimistic that Al-Assad would respond to the protesters’
claims and would carry out significant reforms in the country. I wanted to believe that Al-Assad
would deal with the protesters with at least the minimum level of respect for human rights, and
would not follow the brutal behaviour of his father. However, Al-Assad responded to the
peaceful protesters by killing and torturing people who were calling for their freedom and
dignity. Protesters were not conservative Islamic groups or terrorists; they were nothing more
than youth calling for dignity, equality and justice. I have witnessed the repression and brutality
of the Syrian regime in dealing with the peaceful protesters. As a result, some of my lawyer
colleagues and I were motivated to support revolutionists and advocate for their human rights.
People were very optimistic that the international community would not allow Al-Assad
to stay, and I was one of them. With the international community’s hesitation to respond to the
genocide, my country became the most dangerous state in the world and embraced the most
dangerous terrorist groups. In my opinion, if the international community had contained the
crisis from the beginning, and if international law was able to effectively respond to the suffering
of the Syrian people, Syria would not be in its current state of turmoil. The hesitation of the
international community to respond to the human rights violations, and its respect for the
sovereignty of the tyrannical regime over human rights was a direct cause for the crisis in Syria.
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Chapter 2
Overview of the Syrian Situation
For more than 40 years, the Assad family has ruled Syria. Since 1971, when Hafez AlAssad came to power, Syrians have suffered repression, tyranny, and brutality at the hands of this
family. Many people were optimistic that his son, Bashar Al-Assad, who succeeded him as
president in July 2000, would improve the deteriorating human rights situation in the country,
especially after Bashar Al-Assad’s inaugural speech, which was described as “a space for hope
following the totalitarian years of President [Hafez] Assad.”32 However, the son seemed to adopt
the father’s behaviour. In 2010, Human Right Watch reported that “[t]en years later, these initial
hopes remain unfulfilled, and Al-Assad’s words have not translated into any kind of government
action to promote criticism, transparency, or democracy.”33 Therefore, it was not a surprise that
Syrians decided to rise up against the Al-Assad regime. The Arab Spring encouraged them to
start, as did the resignation of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali after the outbreak of the
Tunisian revolution at the end of 2010, and his escape from Tunisia in January 2011. The
Egyptians’ success in persuading President Hosni Mubarak, who ruled Egypt for more than 30
years, to step down, and his arrest and trial for the crimes he committed against the protesters
was further encouragement. Likewise, the overwhelming support the Libyan opponents of
President Muammar Gaddafi received from the West bolstered the Syrians.
Today, in 2014, “Syrians are on track to becoming the largest refugee population on the
planet,”34 with more than 6 million displaced in the neighbouring countries as well as further

32 Human Rights Watch, A Wasted Decade: Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Assad’s First Ten Years in Power, 16 July 2010 at 2, online:
Human Rights Watch Publications <http://www.hrw.org/node/91580/section/2> [HRW, “Wasted Decade”].
33 Ibid at 2.
34 Marc Garneau, “Marc Garneau: Open Canada’s doors to more Syrian refugees”, Comment, National Post (18 March 2014), online:
<http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/03/18/marc-garneau-open-canadas-doors-to-more-syrian-refugees/> [Garneau].
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away. The United Nations announced its inability to count the death toll.35 The Syrian situation
creates instability in the Middle East and affects international peace and security.36 Mr Ban Kimoon is disturbed about the destiny of the Syrian population. The international community has
no clear vision for the foreseeable future. The West is unhappy and condemns the brutal crimes
in Syria, and it appears that the giant countries are remembering their old calculations from the
Cold War era.
How did the Syrian revolution start? What were the motives? How was the revolution
transformed into a “civil war”? What is the humanitarian situation? What was the reaction of the
international community? To explore these questions, this chapter investigates the situation in
Syria from the beginning of the Syrian revolution in February 2011 until May 2014. It further
explores the humanitarian situation and provides actual numbers and facts based on reports from
international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
and the UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
There are many incidents that demonstrate the ongoing crimes of mass atrocities, but this
research looks at two of the most prominent ones that convinced the international community to
report the Syrian file to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These two incidents were the Use
of Chemical Weapons in Damascus and the Evidence of Industrial-Scale Killing by the Syrian
Regime. This leads to further exploration of the international community’s reaction to these
crimes, including the Security Council’s resolutions for Syria, the Geneva Peace Plan, as well as
many other measures that have failed to resolve the Syrian crisis.
35 John Heilprin, “UN says it can no longer keep track of Syria death toll”, The Associated Press (7 January 2014), online: CTV News
<http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/un-says-it-can-no-longer-keep-track-of-syria-death-toll-1.1626828>.
36 United Nations, Press Release, SC/10752 “Security Council, Meeting on Situation in Syria, Shifts Focus to Plight of Externally, Internally
Displaced Persons: Deputy Secretary-General, High Commissioner for Refugees Deliver Briefings” (30 August 2012), online: UN Meetings
Coverage & Press Releases <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10752.doc.htm>.
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This chapter has two primary aims: (1) to prove that crimes against humanity have been
committed and have escalated on a daily basis to become a serious humanitarian crisis that
requires external help; and (2) although the crimes were committed by both of the warring
parties in the Syria battle – the Syrian regime and the rebels – the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
doctrine applies when the state authority commits crimes against its citizens or when it is not
able to halt such crimes, therefore the concentration will be on the crimes committed by AlAssad regime. The chapter will be divided into three major sections:


The Syrian revolution: the section is divided into three phases,
Phase One: The Birth of the Syrian Revolution in March 2011.
Phase Two: From Non-Violent Uprising to an Armed Struggle (March 2011–July 2012).
Phase Three: From Armed Struggle to Military Deadlock Conflict (July 2012–to date).

 The Humanitarian Situation.
 The International Efforts.

2.1. The Syrian Revolution
The current situation in Syria has evolved from excessively violent suppression of
civilians condemning the regime’s oppression and corruption into an all-out civil war. Therefore,
this section will be divided into three different phases. The first phase will briefly discuss the
birth of the Syrian revolution, and will explain under what circumstances the revolution has
started, the second phase will explore how the Syrian revolution transformed into an armed
struggle conflict, and then the third phase will explain how the struggle escalated to a military
deadlock conflict.
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Phase One: The Birth of the Syrian Revolution – March 2011
Early in 2011 the first signs of the uprising appeared in the Old City of Damascus, the
capital of Syria, with protesters chanting “the Syrian people will not be humiliated.”37 Unarmed
protesters raised their voices calling for reforms in the country. The uprising was in response to
many factors: government corruption, inequality, injustice, as well as the Syrians’ desire for
dignity, democracy, and human rights. The UN Human Rights Council, in its June 2011 Annual
Report, explains “thousands of Syrians participated in public demonstrations in locations across
the country. The initial grievances raised by the demonstrators centered on issues such as
corruption, discrimination, freedom of expression, participation in public affairs and decisionmaking and the release of political prisoners.”38 On March 15, 2011, large-scale but peaceful
demonstrations commenced in Daraa, a city in the southern part of Syria, a group of children,
inspired by the Arab Spring, were detained and tortured by government intelligence agents.
Human Rights Watch said “[t]he Daraa protests, which eventually spread all over Syria, were
sparked by the detention and torture of 15 young boys accused of painting graffiti slogans calling
for the downfall of the regime.”39
Syrians are painfully aware of their forty-year history of violence. In 2010, Human
Rights Watch stated that “Bashar al-Assad inherited a country with a legacy of abusive practices,
but to date he has not taken any concrete steps to acknowledge and address these abuses or shed
light on the fate of thousands of people who have disappeared since the 1980s.” 40 Before the
revolution, Syrians could only whisper in secret about the massacres committed by the Syrian
37 Syrian on, “Damascus Protest 17 February 2011” (2 April 2011) at 2m:15s, online: YouTube
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i41MjEGqprI>.
38 UN HRC, “Rights in Syrian Arab Republic”, supra note at 1 at 3.
39 Human Rights Watch, “We’ve Never Seen Such Horror”: Crimes against Humanity by Syrian Security Forces, 1 June 2011 at 1, online:
Human Rights Watch Publications <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/06/01/we-ve-never-seen-such-horror-0>.
40 HRW, “Wasted Decade”, supra note 32 at 7.
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regime. The most well-known are the massacre of Hama and the Tadmor prison massacre. In
February 1982, the Syrian regime shelled the city of Hama. At that time it was difficult to
document the massacre; however, Robert Fisk, a UK writer and journalist, succeeded to enter the
Syrian city during the 1982 military assault and was an eyewitness to the massacre:
History comes full circle in Syria. In February 1982, President Hafez al-Assad’s
army stormed into the ancient cities to end an Islamist uprising. They killed at least
10,000 men, women and children, possibly 20,000. Some of the men were
members of the armed Muslim Brotherhood.
Almost all the dead were Sunni Muslims, although even senior members of the
Baath party were executed if they had the fatal word Hamwi – a citizen from Hama
– on their identity cards. “Death a thousand times to the hired Muslim Brothers,
who linked themselves to the enemies of the homeland,” Assad said after the
slaughter.41
The other massacre that Syrians may remember well is the Tadmor Prison massacre.
Tadmor Prison was described by Human Rights Watch as “The Kingdom of Death and
Madness.”42 It is well known in Syria “not only for its harsh conditions but also for the
depradations against civilian political prisoners that have occurred within its walls since 1980,
such as torture and summary executions.”43 Hafez Al-Assad committed his massacre after the
failed assassination attempt against him. A Human Rights Watch report in April 1996 describes
the massacre:
An estimated 500 prisoners were killed in cold blood at Tadmor on June 27, 1980,
the day after an assassination attempt in Damascus on the life of President Hafez alAssad. Commando forces from the Defense Brigades and the 138th Security
Brigade were helicoptered to the prison and murdered prisoners in their
dormitories. It is unknown how many other civilian prisoners at Tadmor
41 Robert Fisk, “Robert Fisk: The new focus of Syria’s crackdown has seen similar bloodshed before”, Comment, The Independent (6 July 2011),
online:<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-new-focus-of-syrias-crackdown-has-seen-similar-bloodshedbefore-2307427.html> [Fisk].
42 Human Rights Watch, Syria’s Tadmor Prison: Dissent Still Hostage to a Legacy of Terror, 1 April 1996, Vol. 8, No. 2 (E), online: Human
Rights Watch Publications <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria2.htm> [HRW, “Tadmor Prison”].
43 Ibid.
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subsequently were tried and sentenced there by an exceptional military field court,
in grossly unfair proceedings, and how many of those sentenced to death by the
court were executed by hanging. Nor is it known how many died from torture or
medical neglect … Since 1980, authorities incarcerated thousands of civilian
detainees at Tadmor, including untold numbers detained solely on political grounds
... Severely overcrowded at times, the facility held up to 6,500 civilian prisoners.44
As the Human Rights Watch report indicates, states from the international community attempted
to halt this massacre, but faced the situation they are still facing today. The Syrian regime
“considers expressions of interest by other governments in human rights cases as interference in
Syria’s internal affairs.”45 Human Rights Watch “views these actions as unconscionable and
unjustifiable.”46 Al-Assad crimes were not limited to the last two massacres, other incidents
occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s as Al-Assad tried to eliminate his opponents. Human Rights
Watch documented these crimes and concluded that:
The security forces detained and tortured thousands of members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, communist and other leftist parties, the Iraqi Ba`ath party, Nasserite
parties, and different Palestinian groups—many of whom subsequently
disappeared. While no exact figures exist, various researchers estimate the number
of the disappeared to be 17,000 persons. Syria’s armed forces and security services
also detained and abducted Lebanese, Palestinians, and other Arab nationals during
Syria’s military presence in Lebanon, hundreds of whom are still unaccounted for
… The Syrian security troops committed large scale human rights violations during
the fighting, including the killing of hundreds of people in a series of mass
executions near the municipal stadium and other sites.47
Therefore, what Syrians are facing today is not new for them. They have been under the
same brutal regime for a long time, even before the revolution, and the only difference is that
they can no longer stay silent. Syrians, just like others, desire freedom.

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 HRW, “Wasted Decade”, supra note 32 at 26.
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Phase Two: From Non-Violent Uprising to an Armed Struggle (March 2011–July 2012)
The demonstrations of 2011, where the people were seeking reforms, spread all over the
country. As the repression increased, the numbers joining the demonstrations increased – a few
hundred became thousands. UN Human Rights Council noted:
Yet following the brutal reaction of the Syrian authorities to the incipient
demonstrations, subsequent protests not only called for dialogue and reforms
relating to these grievances, they also rejected the repressive tactics adopted by
Syrian security forces, called for greater respect for fundamental human rights and
freedoms generally, and demanded that far-reaching economic, legal and political
reforms be undertaken on an urgent basis – in particular with respect to the 1963
State of Emergency, which allowed the suspension of fundamental rights and
attributed broad and exceptional powers to the security forces.48
Al-Assad responded by making a few reforms to grant Syrians greater freedoms.49 One
was the declaration of amnesties to free detainees from the Syrian prisons. Unfortunately, these
amnesties freed drug dealers and some dangerous terrorists, not political opponents.50 Another
reform was a referendum for a new constitution. However, the new constitution gave little power
to the citizens, but much power to the President.51 Al-Assad opposition commented that the
constitution “gives sweeping powers to the president to decree laws, appoint the government and
dissolve parliament, and seemed designed to ensure that the current system remains largely intact
… It’s incredibly weak … It confirms our fears that there will be no true reform under Assad,
only cosmetic reforms.”52

48 UN HRC, “Rights in Syrian Arab Republic”, supra note 1 at 3.
49
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2011),

online:

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/24/us-syria-idustre72n2mc20110324>.
50 Al Arabiya News Agencies, “Assad issues fresh general amnesty for crimes committed in Syria ”, Al Arabiya News- Middle East (16April
2013), <online:http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/04/16/Assad-issues-fresh-general-amnesty-for-crimes-in-Syria.html>.
51 Liz Sly, “Syria’s President Assad announces Feb. 26 referendum on new constitution”, The Washington Post (15 February 2012), online:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-announces-feb-26-for-referendum-on-new-constitution/2012/02/15/gIQAo5AbFR_story.html>
[Sly].
52 Ibid.
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Human Rights Watch criticized these reforms by saying that they continue “to be
undermined by the ongoing repression and violence accompanying security operations and it do
not touch on concerns regarding impunity for violations by security services.” 53 As a result,
protesters asked “how the government intended to hold a referendum at a time when violence
[was] engulfing the country.”54 Al-Assad not only continued his violations of human rights but
also intensified his attacks against civilians. The Human Rights Council commented on the
situation:
At the same time [state] Syrian security forces escalated their response to the
demonstrations, deploying military forces to areas where the demonstrations were
the most intense. It is in this general context that allegations of widespread human
rights violations have been reported. These include the excessive use of force in
quelling demonstrators, arbitrary detentions, summary executions, torture and other
cruel or inhuman treatment, violations of the rights to freedom of assembly,
expression, and movement, and violations of the rights to food and health.55
The demonstrations continued to spread across the country as Al-Assad’s regime pursued
an aggressive approach against civilians, involving tanks, infantry carriers, artillery, and the air
force.56 “Over time, many soldiers and officers defected from the Syrian army, the number of
defections increased as the level of violence used by the regime increased. As the uprising
continued, opposition fighters became better equipped, and senior military officers and
government officials also began to defect.”57 On July 29, 2011, a group of officers who had

53 Human Rights Watch, “By All Means Necessary!”: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria, 15
December 2011 at 77, online: RefWorld <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f05a2c92.html>.
54 Sly, supra note 51.
55 UN HRC, “Rights in Syrian Arab Republic”, supra note 1at para 5.
56 Eddie Boxx & Jeffrey White, Responding to Assad’s Use of Airpower in Syria, 20 November 2012, online: The Washington Institute, Policy
Analysis <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/responding-to-assads-use-of-airpower-in-syria>.
57Dawlaty and NPWJ, “Transitional Justice in Syria” (31 July 2013), online:<http://lb.boell.org/sites/default/files/thransisional_justice.pdf>.
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defected from the army announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army. 58 This moved the
revolution into a new phase, which soon escalated into an intensive armed struggle with an
increasingly larger armed opposition.59
Phase Three: From Armed Struggle to Military Deadlock Conflict (July 2012–to date)
The Syrians’ revolution against autocracy that called for dignity, freedom, and equality
turned into a deadlocked conflict. Syria now contains a number of warring parties, each with a
different agenda and convinced that a military victory is possible, and resulting in a civil war in
the country.. The Human Rights Council stated in the September 2013 Report of the Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic that:
The Syrian Arab Republic is a battlefield. Its cities and towns suffer relentless
shelling and sieges. Massacres are perpetrated with impunity. An untold number of
Syrians have disappeared. … Government and pro-government forces have
continued to conduct widespread attacks on the civilian population, committing
murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearance as crimes against humanity. They
have laid siege to neighbourhoods and subjected them to indiscriminate shelling.
Government forces have committed gross violations of human rights and the war
crimes of torture, hostage-taking, murder, execution without due process, rape,
attacking protected objects and pillage. Anti-government armed groups have
committed war crimes, including murder, execution without due process, torture,
hostage-taking and attacking protected objects. They have besieged and
indiscriminately shelled civilian neighbourhoods. Anti-government and Kurdish
armed groups have recruited and used child soldiers in hostilities. The perpetrators
of these violations and crimes, on all sides, act in defiance of international law.60
The country is relatively accessible to jihadists, who are radical Islamists strongly
committed to global military operations, such as Al-Qaeda, Nusra Front, Islamic State of Iraq

58 Joshua Landis, “Free Syrian Army Founded by Seven Officers to Fight the Syrian Army” (29 July 2011), Syria Comment: Syrian Politics,
History, and Religion (blog), online: <http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/free-syrian-army-established-to-fight-the-syrian-army./>.
59

Supra note 58

60 UNHRC, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 24th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/24/46
(September 2013) at 1, online: <http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/a_hrc_24_46_encoisept2013.pdf> [mimeo].
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and Syria/Al-Sham (ISIS),61 and other affiliated groups and conservative parties, who have
emerged from within the rebel parties. Many of these groups are composed of non-Syrian
citizens coming from all around the world for jihad (martyrdom).62 Officials from the West
believe, however, that Al-Assad used these jihadist groups to threaten the Syrian people, who,
generally, are liberal, as well as to threaten the West, because it had fought anti-terrorism since
the events of September 2001. Tom Whitehead per instance, writing in The Telegraph, argues
that there is evidence suggesting that Al-Assad has forged links with terrorists:
[A British official] accused President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime of deliberately
helping radical groups linked to al-Qaeda to come to the forefront of Syria’s civil
war. Mr. Assad’s history of cooperation with al-Qaeda went back to 2005 and 2006
when he allowed its fighters to enter Iraq across Syrian territory. “The regime has
had a relationship with al-Qaeda since 2006,” said the official. The evidence
suggested that Mr Assad has forged links with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) and Jabhat Al-Nusra, two al-Qaeda linked groups, he added. Mr Assad has
released hundreds of radical jihadists from Syria’s jails, with several of them going
on to assume leading positions in both of these movements. The Syrian air force has
concentrated its raids on the moderate opposition, giving al-Qaeda’s allies a degree
of immunity from attack. In addition, the extremists have been able to export oil
from areas they control using transit routes across regime-held territory.63
Unfortunately, the price for freedom is very expensive. Syrians are paying for it every
day at the refugee camps, leaving their homes and missing their loved ones. The continuously
deteriorating humanitarian situation requires external help and action needs to be taken to stop
the bloodshed in Syria. The next section will highlight the humanitarian situation and discuss the
international efforts taken by the international community in an attempt to avert the situation, but
unfortunately, those efforts remain unsuccessful.
61 Ben Wedeman, “CNN Exclusive: Videos show brutality of radical group ISIS in Syria”, CNN World News, (17 February 2014), online:
<http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/17/world/meast/syria-isis-leader-videos/index.html>.
62 Robert Mackey, “A Dutch Jihadist in Syria Speaks, and Blogs” (29 January 2014), The Lede: The New York Times News Blog, online:
<http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/a-dutch-jihadist-in-syria-speaks-and-blogs/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0>.
63 Whitehead, Spencer & Blair, supra note 50.
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2.2. Humanitarian Situation
The Syria situation is considered to be “one of the worst humanitarian crises the world
has seen in recent decades.”64 Since the beginning of the revolution many humanitarian
organizations have reported war crimes and crimes against humanity by the different warring
parties in the Syrian battle. The United Nations Human Rights Office announced, in January
2014, that it “has stopped updating the death toll from Syria's civil war, confirming … that it can
no longer verify the sources of information.”65 However, the Syrian Observatory for Human
Rights, a UK-based organization, on May 19, 2014, documented the death toll since the
beginning of the revolution as being 162,402 persons, includes 8,607 children and 5,586
women.66
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, announced that
“Syrians are on track to become the largest refugee population on the planet. By the end of this
year [2014], they are projected to number over 4-million – more than were caused by the
Rwandan genocide.”67 Moreover, the United Nations expects the number of Syrians displaced
internally, as a result of the war, “to nearly double from some 3.5 million today [February 2014]
to 6.5 million by the end of the year.”68 In addition to the affected children that are in need of aid,
UNICEF reported in March 2014 that:

64 “Syria: A Bearing Witness Trip”, Confront Genocide, the Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
(February 2014), online: <http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/about/initiatives/bearing-witness-trips/syria-a-bearing-witness-trip>.
65 John Heilprin, “UN says it can no longer keep track of Syria death toll”, The Associated Press (7 January 2014), online: CTV News
<http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/un-says-it-can-no-longer-keep-track-of-syria-death-toll-1.1626828>.
66 “More than 162,000 dead in Syria’s since 18/03/2011”, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (19 May 2014), online:
<http://syriahr.com/en/index.php?option=com_news&nid=2275&Itemid=2&task=
displaynews#.U6MGKLGUtyA>.
67 Garneau, supra note 34.
68 “Syrians internally displaced by war expected to nearly double to 6.5 million by year’s end – UN”, UN News Centre (5 February 2014),
online: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 47084&Cr#.U9GafPldXMU>.
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An accelerating crisis for children since March 2013, the number of children
affected by the crisis has more than doubled from 2.3 million to more than 5.5
million. The number of children displaced inside Syria has more than tripled from
920,000 to almost 3 million. The number of child refugees has more than
quadrupled from 260,000 to more than 1.2 million. Of these children, 425,000 are
under the age of five.69
While there are many cases of ongoing mass atrocities, this research focuses on two of
the most prominent cases that persuaded the international community to report the Syrian file to
the ICJ: the use of chemical weapons in Damascus and the evidence of ‘industrial-scale killing’
by the Syrian regime. These two cases will be discussed as an overview of the crimes against
humanity that are being committed on a daily basis in Syria.

The First Case: The Use of Chemical Weapons in Damascus, Al-Ghouta
In August 2013, the international medical humanitarian organization Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) reported receiving “approximately 3,600 patients displaying neurotoxic
symptoms in less than three hours on the morning of Wednesday, 21 August 2013. Of those
patients, 355 reportedly died.”70 MSF could not confirm the cause, but “the reported symptoms
of the patients … strongly indicate mass exposure to a neurotoxic agent. This would constitute a
violation of international humanitarian law, which absolutely prohibits the use of chemical and
biological weapons.”71 In response, the Secretary-General of the United Nations established a
mission to investigate the allegations of the use of chemical weapons. 72 The mission concluded
unequivocally that there was evidence that “chemical weapons have been used in the ongoing
69 UNICEF, Under Siege: The devastating impact on children of three years of conflict in Syria, March 2014 at 3, online: UNICEF Publications
<http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Under_Siege_March_2014.pdf>.
70 “Syria: Thousands suffering neurotoxic symptoms treated in hospitals supported by MSF”, Médecins Sans Frontières (24 August 2013),
online: <http://www.msf.org/article/syria-thousands-suffering-neurotoxic-symptoms-treated-hospitals-supported-msf>.
71 Ibid.
72 UNGA, “Use of Chemical Weapons”, supra note 26 at 4.

22

conflict between the parties in [Syria, and also were used] against civilians, including children,
on a relatively large scale.”73
On September 16, 2013, the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon remarked that the use of
chemical weapons is a war crime:
This is a war crime and a grave violation of the 1925 Protocol and other rules of
customary international law. It is the most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons
against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them in Halabja in 1988 – and the worst use
of weapons of mass destruction in the 21st century. The international community has a
responsibility to ensure that chemical weapons never re-emerge as an instrument of
warfare … There must be accountability for the use of chemical weapons. Any use of
chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, is a crime.74

Both the Syrian regime and the opposition groups, along with their allied states, started to
exchange accusations. Russia accused the opponents of the Syrian regime, with President
Vladimir Putin arguing that “[n]o one doubts that poison gas was used in Syria. But there is
every reason to believe it was used not by the Syrian Army, but by opposition forces, to provoke
intervention by their powerful foreign patrons, who would be siding with the fundamentalists.”75
President Obama, along with US allies, accused the Syrian regime for this crime, and threatened
to mobilize intervention against the Al-Assad regime.76 Against these declarations, and in
response to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2118, dated September 27, 2013,

73 Ibid at 8.
74 “Secretary-General’s press encounter on the Report of the Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian
Arab Republic: Report on the incident of 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus”, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Offthe-Cuff (16 September 2013), online: <www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2985>.
75 Vladimir V. Putin, “A Plea for Caution From Russia: What Putin Has to Say to Americans About Syria”, Editorial, The New York Times (11
September 2013), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?ref=opinion&_r=0>.
76 Aaron Blake, “White House lists 10 countries supporting action on Syria”, The Washington Post (6 September 2013), online:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/06/white-house-lists-10-allies-on-syria/>.
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which demanded the destruction or removal of chemical stockpiles by mid-2014,77 the Al-Assad
regime announced that it would become a signatory to the Convention on the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons and agreed to destroy its chemical weapons.78
In December 2013, Ban Ki-moon called on the international community to hold
accountable those responsible for the use of chemical weapons, saying that “[t]he international
community has a moral and political responsibility to hold accountable those responsible, to
deter future incidents and to ensure that chemical weapons can never re-emerge as an instrument
of warfare.”79 However, despite the international community’s condemnation and the US threats,
the Syrian regime continues to use chemical weapons against civilians. There were strong
allegations “that government forces dropped barrel bombs containing embedded chlorine gas
cylinders in attacks from April 11 to 21 [2014] on three towns in northwestern Syria.”80 Human
Rights Watch conducted an investigation and announced in May 2014 that “[t]hese attacks used
an industrial chemical as a weapon, an act banned by the international treaty prohibiting
chemical weapons that Syria joined in October 2013. The Syrian government is the only party to
the conflict with helicopters and other aircraft.”81
Nadim Houry, the Deputy Director, Middle East and North Africa Division, at Human
Rights Watch, said that “Syria’s apparent use of chlorine gas as a weapon … is a plain violation
of international law … This is one more reason for the UN Security Council to refer the situation
77 United Nations, Press Release, SC/11135 “Security Council Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Unanimously
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online:
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78 Thomas Grove, “Syria Will Sign Chemical Weapons Convention, Declare Arsenal, Foreign Ministry Says”, Reuters (10 September 2013),
online: The World Post <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/syria-chemical-weapons-convention_n_3901417.html>.
79 “Those guilty of chemical weapons attacks in Syria must be held accountable – Ban”, UN News Centre (13 December 2013), online:
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46739#.U3ofECiUtyA>.
80 “Syria: Strong Evidence Government Used Chemicals as a Weapon”, Human Rights Watch News Centre (13 May 2014), online:
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/13/syria-strong-evidence-government-used-chemicals-weapon>.
81 Ibid.
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in Syria to the International Criminal Court…The international community urgently needs to
take firm collective action if it is to prevent and suppress further violations.”82 Although, many
states in the international community condemn the use of chemical weapons in Syria,83 up until
May 2014, the crime has not been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The Second Case: Evidence of Industrial-Scale Killing by the Syrian Regime
In April 2014, “[p]hotographs of about 11,000 Syrians said to have been tortured and
killed by Bashar al-Assad's forces are to be seen … by members of the UN security council as
part of an effort to prosecute the perpetrators for war crimes.”84 The photographs were presented
by “a military policeman who worked secretly with a Syrian opposition group and later defected
and fled the country.”85 The policeman “smuggled the images out of the country on memory
sticks to a contact in the Syrian National Movement.”86 To determine the creditability of the
photographs, an investigation was conducted by three “former prosecutors … Sir Desmond de
Silva QC, former chief prosecutor of the special court for Sierra Leone, Sir Geoffrey Nice QC,
the former lead prosecutor of former Yugoslavian president Slobodan Milosevic, and Professor
David Crane, who indicted President Charles Taylor of Liberia at the Sierra Leone court.” 87 The
prosecutors prepared a report for Carter‐Ruck and Co. Solicitors of London, an international law

82 Ibid.
83 Jay Solomon, “France Accuses Syrian Regime of Multiple Chlorine Gas Attacks”, The Wall Street Journal (13 May 2014), online:
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303851804579560400363946762 >.
84 Ian Black, “Syrian torture images to be examined by UN security council”, The Guardian (15 April 2014), online:
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/syrian-torture-images-security-council-war-crimes>.
85 Ian Black, “Syrian regime document trove shows evidence of 'industrial scale' killing of detainees”, The Guardian (21 January 2014), online:
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/20/evidence-industrial-scale-killing-syria-war-crimes>.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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firm based in the UK, which was appointed by Qatar.88 The report was published to media in
January 20, 2014, and was titled: “A Report into the creditability of certain evidence with regards
to Torture and Execution of Persons Incarcerated by the current Syrian regime.”89 The report
found that the policeman allegations was credible and concluded:





The inquiry team is satisfied that upon the material it has reviewed there is clear
evidence, capable of being believed by a tribunal of fact in a court of law, of
systematic torture and killing of detained persons by the agents of the Syrian
government.
Such evidence would support findings of crimes against humanity against the
current Syrian regime.
Such evidence could also support findings of war crimes against the current
Syrian regime.90

The Syrian regime discharged the allegations, the Syria Ministry of Justice said that “both
photos and report [are] ‘politicised and lacking objectiveness and professionalism’, a ‘gathering
of images of unidentified people, some of whom have turned out to be foreigners.”91 Amnesty
International said that “[w]orld leaders must demand that the Commission of Inquiry and other
human rights bodies be granted immediate access to all places of detention – formal and informal
– in Syria.”92 It further questioned the opinion of the international community toward the crimes
in Syria. Amnesty International condemned the crimes, saying “[i]t certainly raises the question
once again why the Security Council has not yet referred the situation in Syria to the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court.”93 Subsequently, more than 60 countries in the international

88 Ibid.
89 Credibility of certain evidence, supra note 27.
90 Ibid.
91 Ian Black, “Syrian torture images to be examined by UN security council”, The Guardian (15 April 2014), online:
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/syrian-torture-images-security-council-war-crimes>.
92 “Syria peace conference must act on allegations of ‘industrial-scale’ torture and killings in custody”, Amnesty International News (21 January
2014), online: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/syria-peace-conference-must-act-allegations-industrial-scale-torture-and-killings-custody-2014>.
93 Ibid.
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community have suggested that the situation in Syria be referred to the ICC Prosecutor for the
possible prosecution of crimes against humanity.94 Syria is not a signatory to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court; hence the referral should be through the Security Council. The
United Nations drafted resolution S/2014/348 dated May, 22, 2014,95 but Russia and China used
their veto power to stop the referral to the ICC, leaving the perpetrators of these crimes against
humanity to go unpunished. Jan Eliasson, U.N. Deputy-Secretary-General, told the council on
behalf of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon: “If members of the council continue to be unable to
agree on a measure that could provide some accountability for the ongoing crimes, the credibility
of this body and of the entire organization will continue to suffer.”96
These two examples, and many others that are not addressed herein given the length of
this research, have been mentioned to show that the international community has a prima facie
case97 that crimes against humanity are being committed in a systematic way against Syrian
citizens. In addition to the UNSC resolution mentioned above, there were many attempts by
different states in the international community to find legal and peaceful solutions to the crisis in
Syria, however, the next section will explain that these efforts have failed to avert the crisis.

2.3. The International Efforts
One may have expected a radical solution from the international community in response
to the ongoing crisis in Syria and the deterioration in the humanitarian situation there. Following

94 Michelle Nichols & Louis Charbonneau, “Russia, China veto U.N. bid to refer Syria to international court”, Reuters (22 May 2014),
online: <http://www.reuters.com/ article/2014/05/22/us-syria-crisis-un-icc-idUSBREA4L0V920140522> [Nichols & Charbonneau].
95 UNSC, Albania [et al]: draft resolution, UN Doc S/2014/348, May 2014, online:
<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_348.pdf> [mimeo].
96 Nichols & Charbonneau, supra note 94.
97 A prima facie case is the establishment of a legally required rebuttable presumption. See “Prima Facie”, Cornell University Law School Legal
Information Institute, online: <http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_facie>.
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World War II, it was the international community that decided to save people from future
humanitarian disasters. In the simplest terms, the United Nations, through the Security Council,
could authorize humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Unfortunately, the UN Security Council remains deadlocked. Its resolutions in relation to Syria
were precluded by the lack of support from Russia and China, who support the Al-Assad regime
because of their own strategic interests. Moreover, the international community developed an
UN-Arab League Peace Plan to attempt to put an end to the continuous bloodshed in Syria.
Unfortunately, in May 2014, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria,
apologized to Syrians for his inability to find a peaceful solution to end the Syrian crisis after the
failure of the Geneva peace talks.98 The following section addresses the UN Security Council’s
draft resolutions relating to Syria, and then delves into the UN-Arab League missions in Syria.
Deadlock Resolutions
The draft resolution by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that was discussed
above was not the first attempt by the international community to resolve the situation in Syria.
Three different draft resolutions were presented to the UNSC in 2011 and 2012 that expressed
serious concern about the situation in Syria and sought to force the Al-Assad regime to stop its
attacks on civilians.
The first draft resolution was presented on October 4, 2011, and condemned the Syrian
regime’s crackdown on protesters, demanded an immediate end to all violence, and demanded
that the Syrian authorities immediately:

98 Oliver Holmes & Tom Miles, “Mediator apologizes to Syrians for lack of peace progress”, Reuters (15 February 2014),
online:<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/15/us-syria-crisis-brahimi-idUSBREA1E0G220140215> [Holmes & Miles].
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(a) Cease violations of human rights, comply with their obligations under applicable
international law, and cooperate fully with the office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights;
(b) allow the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms by its entire
population, including rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, release
all political prisoners and detained peaceful demonstrators, and lift restrictions on all
forms of media;
(c) cease the use of force against civilians;
(d) alleviate the humanitarian situation in crisis areas, by allowing expeditious,
unhindered and sustained access for internationally recognized human rights
monitors, humanitarian agencies and workers, and restoring basic services including
access to hospitals;
(e) ensure the safe and voluntary return of those who have fled the violence to their
homes.99
The draft resolution stated that it is “the Syrian government’s primary responsibility to protect its
population,” and stressed that:
[T]he only solution to the current crisis in Syria is through an inclusive and Syrianled political process with the aim of effectively addressing the legitimate
aspirations and concerns of the population which will allow the full exercise of
fundamental freedoms for its entire population, including of the rights of freedom
of expression, assembly and peaceful protest.100
The resolution “would have been the first such legally binding move adopted by the Security
Council since President Bashar Assad's military began using tanks and soldiers against protesters
in mid-March.”101 Unfortunately, the resolution was precluded by Russia’s and China’s veto.102
The second draft resolution was presented on February 4, 2012 and demanded that:
the Syrian government immediately put an end to all human rights violations and attacks
against those exercising their rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and
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association, protect its population, fully comply with its obligations under applicable
international law.”103
The resolution also called “for an inclusive Syrian-led political process conducted in an
environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and extremism, and aimed at effectively
addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of Syria’s people, without prejudging the
outcome.”104 However, Russia and China vetoed the draft resolution again, caring for nothing but
their strategic interests in the area.105
The third draft resolution was vetoed on July 19, 2012; it determined “that the situation in
Syria constitutes a threat to international peace and security,”106 and:
[Demanded] the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of, all
elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012)
aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations,
securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition …
leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal
regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing
a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian authorities and the whole
spectrum of the Syrian opposition.107
The draft resolution asserts that the Syrian authorities have to implement it within ten days,108
but again the resolution was precluded by the veto power of Russia and China. Therefore, it is
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clear that states in the international community have tried to find a legally binding resolution to
the Syrian crisis through the Security Council of the United Nations, but so far, have failed.109
Geneva Peace Plan
Alongside the legal efforts of the international community to find a solution to the crisis
in Syria, a series of political and diplomatic measures emerged as well. In February 2012, Mr
Kofi Annan, who was appointed as the first Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the
League of Arab States, set out a six-point proposal that sought the agreement of the warring
parties to:
(1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political
process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and,
to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by
the Envoy;
(2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United
Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to
protect civilians and stabilize the country; …
(3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected
by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily
two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate [the] exact time and modalities of
the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at the local level;
(4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons,
including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in
peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a
list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin
organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond
promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such
persons;
(5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and
a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;
(6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as
legally guaranteed. 110
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In March 2012, the Syrian government and the opposition parties announced their
commitment to implementing the six-point proposal.111 Accordingly, the UNSC issued three
different resolutions to set-up the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS): (1)
Resolution 2042 (2012), that decided “to authorize an advance team of up to 30 unarmed military
observers to liaise with the parties and to begin to report on the implementation of a full
cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties.”112 (2) Resolution 2043 (2012), that
established “for an initial period of 90 days a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
(UNSMIS).”113 (3) Resolution 2059 (2012), that decided “to renew the mandate of UNSMIS for
a final period of 30 days.”114 Moreover, Mr Annan, with a group of states, such as China, France,
Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, and others established the “Action Group for
Syria.”115 The group members agreed on actions to implement the Six-Point plan, and
“guidelines and principles for a political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the
Syrian people,” in addition to “facilitate a Syrian-led political process.”116 However, the mission
was suspended as a result of the increasingly unstable and violent situation in Syria. In addition,
Mr Annan stood down from his post. He said that “the increasing militarisation of the Syrian
conflict and the ‘clear lack of unity’ in the Security Council had ‘fundamentally changed the

111 Ibid.
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circumstances for the effective exercise of my role.’”117 He addressed the problems, which were
“compounded by the disunity of the international community,”118 concluding that the Syrian
people “desperately need action.”119
Following Mr Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi took over the assignment in September 2012.
One of his first notable announcements was that Al-Assad would not be part of the future.120
Brahimi made many attempts to get the warring parties in Syria to the negotiating table. The
most prominent attempt was Geneva II conference on Syria, which existed as a continuation to
its predecessor, the Action Group of Syria or Geneva I. Although it was supported by the efforts
of foreign ministers from both US and Russia,121 Geneva II failed as all previous attempts.
In February 2014, Lakhdar Brahimi apologized to the Syrian people for the lack of
progress at the Geneva peace talks. He said: “I am very, very sorry and I apologize to the Syrian
people ... their hopes ... were very, very high here, that something will happen here.” 122 Mr
Brahimi resigned in May 2014, after apologizing again to Syrians for disappointing them. The
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon confessed that the UN Envoy had “not been able to make
any progress”123 in Syria. He said that Mr Brahimi had faced “almost impossible odds”124
because of an international community that was “hopelessly divided.”125
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This chapter set out to explain the serious humanitarian situation in Syria, and to explore
the different attempts by the international community to find a solution to the crisis, these
attempts included peaceful and legal efforts that remain unsuccessful. The Syrian situation
requires additional efforts. The international community, despite their political interests, should
find a solution to protect Syrian citizens from the ongoing war and the massive violation of
human rights. Therefore, the next chapter will introduce the doctrine of the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P), which was established in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in an attempt to find solutions to stop grave genocides that were
happening around the world, as well as to prevent others in the future.
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Chapter 3
Responsibility to Protect
“Doing nothing is not an option.”126

It is hard to believe that the veto power of Russia and China in the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) has controlled the fate of the Syrian citizens, who have called for their
freedom and dignity, and some of whom have died at the hands of the Syrian regime or the rebel
parties, and others have been displaced all over the world. The question is: Who is responsible?
Does the international community have the responsibility to protect the Syrian citizens?
It is not the first time that the international community has refrained from stemming
bloodshed, arguing that international law prohibits states from intervening in each other’s
internal affairs. Over recent decades, history has witnessed overwhelming man-made
catastrophes. The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed many examples: Northern Iraq,
1991; Somalia, 1993; Rwanda, 1994; Haiti, 1994; Bosnia, 1995; Sierra Leone, 1997; Kosovo,
1999;127 and others. The international community began to wonder how to avoid these massacres
and at the same time protect state sovereignty, and it started to question whether international
law is capable, under its present provisions, of putting an end to such massacres. In a 1999
speech in front of the General Assembly of the United Nations Kofi Annan, the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations at the time noted that “developing international norm[s] in favour
of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose

126 Lee H Hamilton, “Helping a Troubled Continent”, Commentary, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (5 July 2005), online:
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/helping-troubled-continent>. cited at Evans, “Ending Mass Atrocity”, Supra note 13 at 105.
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profound challenges to the international community.”128 Longstanding debates took place, and
questions were asked in the international arena about the “right of humanitarian intervention,”129
the question of “when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive action, in particular,
coercive military action, against another state in order to protect people at risk in that other
state.”130 However, in 2000, Kofi Annan tried to challenge these debates by asking the world
leaders who gathered at the Millennium General Assembly:
If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? In
essence, the problem is one of responsibility: in circumstances in which universally
accepted human rights are being violated on a massive scale we have a
responsibility to act.131
Accordingly, in September 2000, “the Government of Canada, together with a group of
major foundations, announced at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) the
establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS).”132 The ICISS announced that they were tasked to “[w]restle with the whole range of
questions – legal, moral, operational and political – rolled up in this debate, to consult with the
widest possible range of opinion around the world, and to bring back a report that would help the
Secretary-General and everyone else find some new common ground.”133 In December 2001 the
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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty presented its report titled the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
This chapter will clarify the meaning of R2P and review the endorsements and the further
developments on the responsibility to protect doctrine after 2001. It will also briefly define the
term “mass atrocity crimes” because it is often used in the R2P language and defining it will
make it easier to understand the different kinds of crimes against humanity. The chapter then
discusses two different responsibilities of R2P – the “responsibility to prevent” and the
“responsibility to react” – and tries to connect them directly to the measures that have been taken
in relation to Syria by the international community. The chapter will also apply the criteria
suggested by the ICISS, to justify a military intervention for humanitarian purposes.
R2P doctrine has received a lot of criticism in political and scholarly debates. These
debates will be discussed, where relevant, in each section. The chapter poses the question of
whether Syria is indeed a R2P situation. To answer this question, the three pillars to implement
the responsibility to protect, which were suggested by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations in 2009, will be applied to find out the answer to this question. Finally, the chapter will
conclude by suggesting that R2P, despite the criticism of it, should apply in the Syrian case
because of the political deadlock and the massive humanitarian crisis. Therefore, the chapter is
divided to the following sections:


R2P: Its Meaning and Evolution



Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect



Is Syria an R2P Situation?
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3.1 R2P: Its Meaning and Evolution
R2P is an emerging norm of international law, and it was endorsed by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations at the United Nations General Assembly in 2004:
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility
to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a
last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or
serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments
have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.134
R2P states that: (1) “[t]he State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;”135
(2) “[t]he international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling
this responsibility;”136 and (3) “if the state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the
international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”137
R2P contains two major principles. First, it clearly declares that “[s]tate sovereignty
implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the
state itself.”

138

The second principle of R2P is that “where a population is suffering serious

harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question
is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the
international responsibility to protect.”139 Therefore, R2P changes the way of understanding
intervention and considers that “the debate about intervention for human protection purposes

134 UNGA, “Note by the Secretary-General”, supra note 3 at para 203 .
135 UN, “The R2P”, supra note 7.
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should focus not on ‘the right to intervene’, but on ‘the responsibility to protect.’”140 ICISS
explains that “the responsibility to protect implies an evaluation of the issues from the point of
view of those seeking or needing support, rather than those who may be considering
intervention.”141 The framework R2P doctrine is built on the following foundation of:
A. Obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty;
B. The responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter,
for the maintenance of international peace and security;
C. Specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection
declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and
national law;
D. The developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security
Council itself.142
Mass Atrocity Crimes
The language of R2P often uses the terminology “mass atrocity crimes.” Thus, before
moving on, it is important to explain what the term means. Gareth Evans, the co-chair of ICISS,
explains that “the expressions ‘mass atrocities’ or ‘mass atrocity crimes’ are used more or less
interchangeably to refer to what is now embraced by the description ‘genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,’ which in turn defines the ‘responsibility to
protect’”143 Evans states that “‘Mass’ is not a legal term of art, and many kinds of war crimes and
crimes against humanity can, as a matter of law, be committed without large numbers of victims
being involved.”144 He stresses that this terminology is used to “reflect the political reality that
the kind of atrocity crimes around which the responsibility to protect debate actually revolves are
essentially those committed on a large scale and what, in turn counts as ‘large scale’ will always

140 ICISS, supra note 4 at 17.
141 Ibid.
142 ICISS, supra note 4 at XI.
143 Evans, “Ending Mass Atrocity”, supra note 13 at 11.
144 Ibid at 12.
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be a matter of context.”145 Furthermore, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
states, in Article 7, that it considers as crimes against humanity:
[A]any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
...
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
…
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
…
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.146
Article (7) of the Statute further defines these acts (only those that are used in the language of
R2P are listed) as:
(a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter
alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about
the destruction of part of a population;
…
(e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the
145 Ibid.
146 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, 37 ILM 999 (entered into force 1 July 2002), UN Doc
A/CONF.183/9, online: United Nations Treaty Collection <http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm> [ICC]. In the R2P context, see e.g. ICISS,
supra note 4 at 24.
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accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
…
(g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental
rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or
collectivity.147
As noted earlier in Chapter two, and this chapter will discuss it further, many of these crimes
have committed in Syria by either the Syrian regime or the warring parties.

2005 World Summit
In September 2005, at the United Nations World Summit, the UNGA accepted the R2P
doctrine. More than 150 heads of state and government unanimously endorsed the doctrine and
committed to protect humanity from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity.148 The World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) confirmed the three following
core principles:
138.
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement,
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act
in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate,
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 149
139.
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and
147 Ibid.
148 Evans, “Ending Mass Atrocity”, supra note 13 at 47.
149 UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005: 60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome, 60th Sess, UN Doc
A/RES/60/1, October 2005 at para 138, online: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf> [mimeo] [UNGA,
“Res 60/1”].
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decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter,
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant
regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.150
R2P was reaffirmed later in 2006, by the UNSC resolution 1674,151 on the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict, and in 2009, when the UNSC

adopted resolution

1706,152 authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in Darfur referring to resolution
1674, and to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 WSOD.153
United Nations Endorsement in 2009
In January 2009, Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, issued a
report that stated the R2P doctrine and the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the WSOD
are “firmly anchored in well-established principles of international law. Under conventional and
customary international law, States have obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity.”154 The report further noted that during the 20th century three
factors stood out in all of the worst human tragedies: “First, in each case there were warning
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signs .... Second, the signals of trouble ahead were, time and again, ignored, set aside or
minimized by high-level national and international decision makers with competing political
agendas. Third, at times the United Nations … failed to do its part.”155 These factors led Mr Ban
Ki-moon to formulate the three pillars on which R2P rests:
Pillar one: The Protection responsibilities of the state
The enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals
or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,
and from their incitement. … The responsibility derives both from the nature of
State sovereignty and from the pre-existing and continuing legal obligations of
States, not just from the relatively recent enunciation and acceptance of the
responsibility to protect;
Pillar two: International assistance and capacity-building
Pillar two is the commitment of the international community to assist States in
meeting those obligations. It seeks to draw on the cooperation of Member States,
regional and sub-regional arrangements, civil society and the private sector, as well
as on the institutional strengths and comparative advantages of the United Nations
system. Too often ignored by pundits and policymakers alike, pillar two is critical to
forging a policy, procedure and practice that can be consistently applied and widely
supported. Prevention, building on pillars one and two, is a key ingredient for a
successful strategy for the responsibility to protect;156
Pillar three: Timely and decisive response
The responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive
manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection.157

With these three pillars the Secretary-General not only shapes the strategy that is suggested by
the ICISS to implement R2P but also confirms the responsibility of states of the international
community to take collective action when a nation state fails to protect its citizens.
However, before delving into details, I want to highlight to the idea that the United
Nations made some efforts to improve the initial report of the ICISS. In the opinion of some

155 Ibid at para 6.
156 Ibid at para 11.
157 Ibid.
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commenters, these efforts led “to a diluting of the commitments contained in the 2005 Outcome
Document.”158 Nevertheless, this thesis is concerned with the concept of the responsibility to
protect as mentioned in the report of the ICISS and its implementation in the Syrian situation.
This concept was an innovation in motivating the international community to fulfill its
obligations to protect people who are suffering around the world, to find solutions to the ongoing
genocides, and to prevent crimes from happening again in the future. In my personal opinion, the
report of the ICISS is a very useful manual for the international community to consider before
any intervention decision because it suggests different operational measures, which

I will

discuss hereafter.

3.2 How to Operate the Responsibility to Protect
According to R2P, in cases of mass atrocity crimes where the state is unable or unwilling
to avert such crimes, the international community is accountable to take measures that are
proportional to the scale of threat.159 The responsibility to protect “directs our attention to the
costs and results of action versus no action, and provides conceptual, normative and operational
linkages between assistance, intervention and reconstruction.”160 ICISS asserts that the
responsibility to protect encompasses other duties. It explains that “the responsibility to protect
means not just the ‘responsibility to react,’ but also the ‘responsibility to prevent’ and the
‘responsibility to rebuild’ as well.”161 The international community takes different paths to
implement each of these responsibilities, and their efforts should concentrate to “address both the

158 Stephen Kirwan, “Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Towards a Consistent Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect in International Law”
(2013) 16 Trinity CL Rev 37.
159 ICISS, supra note 4 at XIII.
160 ICISS, supra note 4 at 17.
161 Ibid.
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root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations
at risk.”162 R2P suggests different measures in each of the responsibilities and different
instruments reflect the need of each stage. The measures essentially have the same components,
which include political/diplomatic, economic, legal and military measures.

163

The measures of

both the responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to react will be discussed below, and in
many places the different measures that have been implemented by the international community
in Syria will be explained.

3.2.1 The Responsibility to Prevent
Prior to the emergence of the R2P doctrine, those that were concerned about global
security recognized the importance of prevention in order to avoid wars. In 1948, General Omar
Bradly, US army field commander in North Africa and Europe during World War II and a
General of the United States Army, said: “Wars can be prevented just as surely as they can be
provoked, and we who fail to prevent them must share the guilt for the dead.”164 R2P recognizes
prevention as the “single most important dimension of the responsibility … [that] should always
be exhausted before intervention is contemplated.”165
The principle of prevention is grounded in international law. A strong example of the
principle is the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter tasks the UNSC to maintain
international peace and security,166 and Article 55 of the Charter implies that:

162 Ibid at XI.
163 Ibid at 23.
164 Omar Bradley, quoted in Evans, “Ending Mass Atrocity”, supra note 13 at 79.
165 ICISS, supra note 4 at XI.
166 Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations implies that “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken.” In the R2P context, see e.g.
ICISS, supra note 4 at 22.
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[W]with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations ... the United Nations
shall promote:
a- …
b- solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation;167
ICISS explains that the Charter “provides the foundation for a comprehensive and long-term
approach to conflict prevention based on an expanded concept of peace and security.”168 Hence,
the prevention measure that is suggested by the ICISS to implement R2P is primarily recognized
in international law.
For effective conflict prevention efforts, R2P sets different prevention measures. These measures
are political and diplomatic measures, economic measures, legal measures, and military
measures. Many of these measures have been carried out in an attempt to prevent the Syrian
crisis. These measures have to be accomplished with the assistance of various national and
international human rights groups and the media.169 In Syria, various reports, as explained earlier
in Chapter two, were “complemented by the monitoring and reporting capacity of international
and national human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights
Watch (HRW).”170 The reports of these organizations have influence on the decisions of the
international community because of credibility and trustworthiness. Hereafter, I am going to
explain the components of each of the four different measures of the responsibility to prevent,
and explore some of the efforts undertaken by the international community in Syria.

167 UN Charter, supra note 14. In the R2P context, see e.g ICISS, supra note 4 at 22.
168 ICISS, supra note 4 at 22.
169 Ibid at 21.
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Political and Diplomatic Measures
According to ICISS report, the political and diplomatic measures “may include the direct
involvement of the UN Secretary-General, as well as fact-finding missions, friends groups,
eminent persons commissions, dialogue and mediation through good offices, international
appeals, and non-official ‘second track’ dialogue and problem-solving workshops.”171 If these
measures are inadequate, the international community may decide to take a different scale of
preventive measures, such as “the threat or application of political sanctions, diplomatic
isolation, suspension of organization membership, travel and asset restrictions on targeted
persons, ‘naming and shaming,’ and other such actions.”172
In Syria, the international community, following earlier attempts at prevention, imposed
travel bans and froze assets of some of the notable Syrian regime figures.173 It also suspended
Syria as a permanent chair of the Arab League.174 Furthermore, the international community
established the Friends of Syria Group175 and instituted the Independent International
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the alleged violations of international human rights law.176
It tasked the UN-Arab League joint envoy, who established the Action Group for Syria, to set up
the peace plan, and the international community also appointed the United Nations Supervision
Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to observe the implementation of the peace plan. 177 Hence, the

171 Ibid at 24.
172 Ibid.
173 “Q&A: Syria sanctions”, BBC News (23 March 2012), online: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15753975> [Q&A: Syria
sanctions].
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international community implemented all possible political and diplomatic measures in Syria in
accordance with the responsibility to prevent.
Economic Measures
R2P suggests positive and negative inducements when imposing economic measures.178
The positive measures “might include promises of new funding or investment, or the promise of
more favourable trade terms.”179 The negative inducements usually are “of a more coercive
nature, including threats of trade and financial sanctions; withdrawal of investment; threats to
withdraw [International Monetary Fund (IMF)] or World Bank support; and the curtailment of
aid and other assistance.”180 Many of these measures have been practised in Syria. The EU
banned crude oil imports from Syria, and it blocked trade in gold and precious metals and
diamonds with Syrian public bodies and the Syrian Central Bank; furthermore, Arab
governments halted investment in projects in Syria. 181
Legal Measures
ICISS noted that “the threat to seek or apply international legal sanctions has in recent
years, become a major new weapon in the international preventive armoury … [It] will
concentrate the minds of potential perpetrators of crimes against humanity on the risks they run
of international retribution.”182 The most prominent legal measure is the referral to the ICC,
which helps to end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community.183 Recently, the UNSC referred the cases for war crimes from Darfur184
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179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 Q&A: Syria sanctions, supra note 173.
182 ICISS, supra note 4 at 24.
183 ICC, supra note 146. In the R2P context, see e.g. ICISS, supra note 4 at 24.

48

and Libya.185 Nevertheless, it failed to refer either Al-Assad and his regime or the rebel groups,
who committed crimes in Syria, to the International Criminal Court for investigation of possible
breaches of human rights and for crimes against humanity. The international community “called
for an ICC investigation, drawing on evidence collected by the UN Human Rights Council’s
Independent International Commission of Inquiry.”186 As explained earlier, the international
community attempt to implement some legal measures in Syria by referring the crimes in Syria
to the ICC, but it failed due Russia’s and China’s veto on the draft resolution by the UNSC.187
Military Measures
Military measures are usually limited in the prevention stage, but it could include “standoff reconnaissance, or in particular a consensual preventive deployment of which the UN
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia is the clearest example ... In extreme
cases, direct prevention might involve the threat to use force.”188 In Syria, a military preventive
measure was also exercised. In May 2011, “the European Union imposed a full arms embargo on
Syria in response to the violent repression by Syrian government forces on peaceful protests and
the following violent conflict in the country.”189 The military efforts were inadequate to halt or
avert the Syrian crisis and the grave violation of human rights in the country.
Therefore, it is clear that the international community has exhausted all the prevention
measure in Syria in an attempt to not lose any chance for a peaceful solution to the crisis.
184 UNSC, Resolution 1593 (2005): Adopted by the Security Council at its 5158th meeting, on 31 March 2005, UN Doc S/Res/1593, March
2005, online: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/85FEBD1A-29F8-4EC4-9566-48EDF55CC587/283244/N0529273.pdf> [mimeo].
185 UNSC, Resolution 1970 (2011): Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491th meeting, on 26 February 2011, UN Doc S/Res/1970, February
2011, online: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/081A9013-B03D-4859-9D61-5D0B0F2F5EFA/0/1970Eng.pdf> [mimeo].
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Obviously, nothing worked to end the Syrian state authorities’ violence on civilians. Therefore,
and as per the R2P, the international community has to implement the reaction measure.

3.2.2. The Responsibility to React
When a crisis is escalating, and there is urgent need for humanitarian protection, and
when the “preventive measures fail to resolve or contain the situation and when a state is unable
or unwilling to redress the situation, then interventionary measures by other members of the
broader community of states may be required.”190 R2P recognizes the responsibility to react as a
response to “situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures.”191 However, these
measures have a more coercive nature than those in the responsibility to prevent, as the measures
may, if they fail, lead to the use of force in extreme cases, especially when the crisis affects
international peace and security.192 Hence, the starting point should always be the nonintervention measures such as sanctions, peacekeeping to protect civilian,193 “safe havens and
no-fly zones,”194 and arms embargoes.195 If these measures do not succeed to halt the crisis and
human rights are under question, then military intervention could be used as an exceptional
measure to the non-intervention concept in international law – but only as a last resort and under
certain criteria.196 Therefore, if there is no other solution but to use force, R2P identifies six
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criteria that should be fulfilled before taking any decision for military intervention. These criteria
are as follows:197
Criterion One: Threshold Criteria – Just Cause
R2P considers that the “exceptions to the principle of non-intervention should be limited.
Military intervention for human protection purposes must be regarded as an exceptional and
extraordinary measure, and for it to be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm
occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur.”198 The just cause criterion will be
satisfied if there is one of the following:
1. Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not,
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability
to act, or a failed state situation; or
2. Large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried out by
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.199
As discussed in Chapter two, large scale loss of life and crimes that shock the
consciences of humanity were reported in Syria by human rights organizations, who
accused the Al-Assad regime of attacks against civilians and of using “increasingly deadly
and indiscriminate weapons, culminating in a chemical weapons attack.”200 In addition, the
“Syrian government and pro-government forces conducted several large-scale military
operations across the country during which government forces and pro-government militias
carried out mass killings.”201 At the same time, foreign fighters “carried out serious abuses
including indiscriminate attacks, extrajudicial executions, kidnapping, and torture.”202 The
killing is escalating daily and the Syrian government not only has failed to protect Syrian
197 Ibid at 32.
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citizens, but has also involved itself in atrocity crimes. Alex Ballemy and Tim Dunne noted
two features in the continuous reports on Syria. The first is “that the situation on the ground
reaches ‘new levels of brutality’ … and people are trapped in conflict-affected areas of the
country.”203 The second is that “while it is acknowledged that crimes against humanity are
being committed by several armed groups, the government’s willingness and capacity to
use highly destructive and indiscriminate weaponry is unrivalled. And, whoever is using
force, it is still the government that has the primary responsibility to ensure protection of
the population.”204 Therefore, the just cause criterion applies to the Syria situation.
Criterion Two: Right Intention
R2P asserts that, relieving human suffering and averting the violation of human
rights must be the main reasons for any intervention, “whatever other motives intervening
states may have.”205 Therefore, R2P assumes that it is better to resume the intervention with
“multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims
concerned.”206 In the words of Gareth Evans, “the motive of any such action … [must] be
civilian protection … and have no other agenda. That means, in particular, that there must
be no hint of a suggestion here that the military action is really about securing regime
change.”207 This could be satisfied in the Syrian case if a coalition of countries existed and
desired to save Syrians and did not have any other intentions. This criterion could possibly
have been satisfied had the US and the UK decided to attack Al-Assad regime in August
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2013, without the approval of the UNSC, upon discovering the use of chemical weapons
against civilians. But the issue here, I believe, is the opposite –they did not pursue the
attack because there was not enough intention. This point will be discussed in Chapter 5 to
argue that there is not enough interest at the international community level to avert the
Syrians crisis.
Criterion Three: Proportional Means
The decision to take military action should consider “the scale, duration and intensity of
the planned military intervention [which] should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined
human protection objective.”208 In addition, the decision has to consider that “the means have to
be commensurate with the ends, and in line with the magnitude of the original provocation. The
effect on the political system of the country targeted should be limited, again, to what is strictly
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the intervention.”209 Evans has applied the criterion to his
consideration of the incident of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Evans suggests “doing that
which is necessary, and no more than that, to deter any future use of chemical weapons. It does
not mean full-scale war designed to achieve regime change.”210
Criterion Four: Reasonable Prospects
When military intervention is undertaken, the “action can only be justified if it stands a
reasonable chance of success, that is, halting or averting the atrocities or suffering that triggered
the intervention in the first place.”211 Accordingly, the intervention can’t take place “if actual
protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are
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likely to be worse than if there is no action at all.”212 Typically, the intervention “cannot be
justified if in the process it triggers a larger conflict. It will be the case that some human beings
simply cannot be rescued except at unacceptable cost – perhaps of a larger regional
conflagration, involving major military powers. In such cases, however painful the reality,
coercive military action is no longer justified.”213 This criterion cannot be applied to the Syrian
case as there was no occurrence of a military intervention.
Criterion Five: Last Resort
This criterion requires that all peaceful measures must be exhausted before any decision on
military decision is taken. R2P considers that “intervention can only be justified when every nonmilitary option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with
reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.”214 In Syria, from
March 2011 to date (May 2014), the international community proposed different international
peaceful attempts, in addition to the diplomatic, economic, and legal measures. All of these
efforts have failed to achieve any solution or to halt the crisis, and at the same time, the scale of
violence in the country is constantly increasing which is causing a large loss of lives that require
a radical solution. Accordingly, if the international community decided to intervene in Syria, this
criterion will be satisfied.
Criterion Six: The Right Authority
The UNSC is the only party named by international law to authorize the use of military
force against states in very extreme cases. The R2P affirms that the United Nations Security
Council is the main legislative authority and its “authorization should in all cases be sought prior
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to any military intervention being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally
request such authorization.”215 However, the political and strategic interests of the five
permanent members at the UNSC could be an obstacle if a decision for humanitarian
intervention does not comply with their own interests. In the case of Syria, all resolutions
throughout the UNSC have not been possible due to the opposition of Russia and China. That is
why R2P insists that the “Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to
apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the
passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which
there is otherwise majority support.”216 However, for the purpose of avoiding such cases where
another country uses its veto power, R2P proposes that in a case where the UNSC rejects a
proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, the alternative options are:
I. Consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special
Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and
II. Action within the area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations
under Chapter VIII of the Charter,217 subject to their seeking subsequent
authorization from the Security Council.218
R2P, then, gives alternatives to the sole authority that is granted to the UNSC by the
Charter of the United Nations, in order to avert genocide when the UNSC remains deadlocked. It
further warns that hesitation about taking the right action will diminish the authority of the UN,
therefore, R2P suggests that “the Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations
that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations … the
215 Ibid at XII.
216 Ibid at XIII.
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stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.”219 In this context, David
Chandler agrees with the ICISS. He admits that R2P shifts toward “a pragmatic response to
changes in Realpolitik as it is a response based on concern for the world’s victims. If the UN
Security Council does not reach a consensus on intervention the Secretary-General has warned
that ‘there is a grave danger’ that the Security Council will be bypassed, as over Kosovo.” 220
Chandler, however, viewed the argument from another prospective as well, noting that “[i]t
would appear that in seeking to ensure that the UN remains central to legitimizing intervention
by giving UN legitimacy to any such intervention independently of the UN’s political role in
building an international consensus, the Commission’s proposals, if acted upon, may well
undermine the UN, rather than ensuring that it works ‘better’.”221
As a matter of fact, there has been a lot of debate by political leaders and scholars about
R2P. Thomas Weiss argues that, with few exceptions, “no idea has moved faster or farther in the
international normative arena than the Responsibility to Protect.”222 Weiss explains that “ICISS
contribution consists of moving away from the rights of outsiders to intervene toward a framing
that spotlights those suffering from war and violence ...the new perspective thus prioritizes the
rights of those suffering from starvation or systematic rape and the duty of states and
international institutions to respond.”223 Weiss points out that “the ICISS was originally
established because of the Security Council's failure to address dire humanitarian crises in
Rwanda and Kosovo.”224 Consequently, Weiss explains, “the repeated failure to come to the
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rescue mocks the value of the emerging R2P norm and ultimately may further erode public
support for the United Nations.”225
That is why Gareth Evans, from a similar point of view, asks what are the options when
helpless citizens are suffering. If “prevention fails, conflict breaks out within a state, and mass
atrocity crimes are occurring or imminent, it is not an option for the world to stand by and do
nothing: that way lies, yet again, the horror of Rwanda and Srebrenica.” 226 Evans thinks that the
ICISS report made several contributions, perhaps the most useful being political, that is,
inventing a new way of talking about humanitarian interventions. 227 Evans explains the debates
as not being “about the ‘right’ of states to do anything but rather about their ‘responsibility’ … to
protect people at grave risk.”228
From the other point of view, some scholars are suspicious that R2P, as a legal norm, will
be modified to fulfill the interests of the strong states and their desire to invade the weak ones.
Noam Chomsky supports this vision by illustrating that human rights and international justice are
only justifications for the West’s interests, and says that “‘new interventionism’ … is replaying
an old record.”229 Chomsky believes that:
It is an updated variant of traditional practices that were impeded in a bipolar world
system that allowed some space for non-alignment – a concept that effectively
vanishes when one of the two poles disappears ... the Cold War victors are more
free to exercise their will under the cloak of good intentions but in pursuit of
interests that have a very familiar ring outside the realm of enlightenment.230
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For the purpose of analysing the different points of view around R2P, S. Neil
Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss categorize the arguments around R2P
into three “distinct clusters of opinion.”231 In the first cluster are the opponents to the
Responsibility to Protect, which are also divided into four groups: the first group view the R2P as
“potential to divide the world into ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ zones and promotes a return to
semi-colonial practices in the latter. Not least, it is argued that powerful states will determine
whose human rights justify departure from the principle of non-intervention.”232 In the second
group of critics are those who are “uncomfortable with instrumental decision making,” their
vision that the decision for humanitarian intervention “[c]ontinu[es] on a case-by-case basis
raises the matter of selectivity and arbitrary application, which affect legitimacy.”233 The third
group are those who are labelled by Macfarlane, Thielking, and Weiss as “backed off from
humanitarian intervention,” those who want to go back to the “good old days.” 234 The last group
are the advocacy organizations that “warn about the effects of a politically motivated
interpretation of the concept of a responsibility to protect.”235 The second cluster in Macfarlane,
Thielking, and Weiss’s categorization are the “agnostics and sceptics” who see the debate around
the R2P as not solving the “fundamental problems of insufficient political will or provid[ing] a
politically realistic blueprint for the changes in state practice that would be required to make the
responsibility to protect meaningful in policy and operational terms.”236 While the third cluster
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consists of those optimists who see the ICISS report and the R2P as “guide[s] to action,”237 that
is “realistic and substantial step[s]”238 on the road to the capture of “a workable consensus,” they
view the R2P as an attempt at “logical extension of the ethical dimension in foreign policy.”239
They further consider the report and the R2P as “the most comprehensive attempt[s] to date to
tackle sovereignty versus intervention.” 240
It seems the case that all, the supporters and the opponents of R2P, recognize the problem
that there are conscious-shocking, man-made crises behind the scenes. They also recognize that
there is a need for a radical legal solution to respond to the massacres being committed on a daily
basis around the world that have a negative impact on ensuring stability and peace in the world.
Law, broadly speaking, should be variable over time to suit the requirements of each era because
what would be appropriate at one time may not work at other times. This necessity has sparked
the creation of the R2P principle as a step towards finding legal alternatives in cases where
international law is unable to act. Syria is a case where international law is unable to find a legal
solution to end the crisis, leaving the military solutions to prevail over the law. The next section
discusses the Syrian case to decide first if Syria can be considered an R2P case, so as to allow the
international community to exercise its responsibility in accordance with the doctrine.

3.3 Is Syrian an R2P Situation?
Gareth Evans asked the question, “what makes a country one of R2P concern?” Evans
answers his own question by arguing that “R2P situations are those where mass atrocity crimes
… are actually occurring or imminently about to occur … They are situations, actual or
237 Ibid at 981.
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reasonably foreseeable, that should engage the attention of the international community simply
because of the particularly conscience-shocking character of the conduct actually or potentially
involved.”241 This section tries to answer the question of whether Syria constitutes an R2P case.
To answer this question, I will associate the three pillars of R2P that were suggested by the
Secretary-General in 2009, to the Syrian case using the analysis conducted in the previous
section. The section is not intended to repeat what already been discussed, but rather to answer
this question.
Pillar One: The Protection Responsibilities of the Syrian Government:
This Pillar implies that “the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations,
whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity, and from their incitement.”242 In Syria, as discussed in Chapter two, the United
Nations and multiple international human rights organizations concerned by the Syrian situation
have continuously reported the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria and the mass
atrocity crimes that are escalating every day. According to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, state responsibility “derives both from the nature of State sovereignty and from the preexisting and continuing legal obligations of States.”243 Therefore, the Syrian government, as a
sovereign state, has enduring responsibility to protect its citizens from mass atrocity crimes and
their incitement, but the authorities have manifestly failed to provide such protection.
Conversely, the Syrian government has not only failed to protect its citizens but also was
involved in crimes against humanity. The report of the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic stated that “the Government has manifestly failed in its
241 Evans, “Ending Mass Atrocity”, supra note 13 at 72.
242 UNGA, “Implementing R2P”, supra note 30 at para 11.
243 Ibid.
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responsibility to protect its people. Since November 2011, its forces have committed more
widespread, systematic and gross human rights violations.”244 Accordingly, the first pillar of the
R2P is applicable to the Syria situation.
Pillar Two: International Assistance and Capacity-Building
Pillar two implies that:
Pillar two is the commitment of the international community to assist States in
meeting those obligations. It seeks to draw on the cooperation of Member States,
regional and subregional arrangements, civil society and the private sector, as well
as on the institutional strengths and comparative advantages of the United Nations
system. Too often ignored by pundits and policymakers alike, pillar two is critical
to forging a policy, procedure and practice that can be consistently applied and
widely supported. Prevention, building on pillars one and two, is a key ingredient
for a successful strategy for the responsibility to protect.245
As a result of the failure of the Syrian government to protect its citizens, the international
community, in accordance with the R2P doctrine, is committed to assist the Syrian government
to meet its obligations in protection. As explored above, the international community has
exhausted all the possible peaceful measures to prevent the crisis from escalating. Its efforts
included implementing the R2P’s diplomatic and political measures, the economic measures, the
legal measures and the military measures. Therefore, the international community has satisfied
all possible measures to assist the Syrian government to protect its citizens and avert the crisis,
but it is clear that these efforts could neither stop the crisis, nor halt the human suffering. This
makes the second pillar of the R2P applicable to the Syrian situation.
Pillar Three: Timely and Decisive Response

244 UNHRC, Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 19th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/19/69
(February 2012), online: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/106/13/PDF/G1210613.pdf?OpenElement> [mimeo].
245 UNGA, “Implementing R2P”, supra note 30 at para 11.
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Pillar three implies “the responsibility of member States to respond collectively in a timely and
decisive manner when a state is manifestly failing to provide such protection.”246 To implement
this pillar the report of the Secretary-General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
affirms that “the first two sentences of paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome make
unambiguously clear.”247
Paragraph 139 underscores that a wider range of collective actions, either peaceful
or non-peaceful, could be invoked by the international community if two conditions
are met:
(a) “should peaceful means be inadequate”, and
(b) “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from the
four specified crimes and violations.248
The two conditions are fulfilled in the Syria situation: (1) the peaceful measures have
been inadequate and have failed to resolve the crisis; (2) the Syrian national authorities have
manifestly failde to halt the crimes and contain the crisis. Hence, the third pillar is applicable to
Syria. The report affirms, in paragraph 49, that the international community should respond in
accordance with the second sentence of paragraph 139 that underlines “we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant
regional organizations as appropriate.”249 The Secretary-General noted in paragraph 54 of the
report of Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, that:
It is now well established in international law and practice that sovereignty does not
bestow impunity on those who organize, incite or commit crimes relating to the
responsibility to protect. In paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome, States affirmed
their responsibility to prevent the incitement of the four specified crimes and
violations. When a State manifestly fails to prevent such incitement, the
international community should remind the authorities of this obligation and that
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid at para 49.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
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such acts could be referred to the International Criminal Court, under the Rome
Statute.250
Therefore, in answering the question of whether Syria is an R2P situation, the three pillars are
used to illustrate that Syria is a R2P situation, which means that it is the responsibility of the
international community to respond to the Syrian crisis in accordance with the doctrine of the
responsibility to protect.
There is the will in the international community for intervention to be taken under the
UNSC authorization, using the power of Chapter VII, but due to Russia’s and China’s repeated
use of their veto power on the UNSC resolutions for Syria, it is difficult to imagine that such
responsibility will be practised under the rule of Chapter VII. The Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, has urged the UNSC’s five permanent members to “refrain from
employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations
relating to the responsibility to protect, as defined in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, and
to reach a mutual understanding to that effect.”251 However, in the same report, the SecretaryGeneral insists that:
All Member States, not just the 15 members of the Security Council, should be
acutely aware of both public expectations and shared responsibilities. If the General
Assembly is to play a leading role in shaping a United Nations response, then all
192 Member States should share the responsibility to make it an effective
instrument for advancing the principles relating to the responsibility to protect
expressed so clearly in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome.252

There are now continuous calls by politicians and scholars in international law to find
alternatives to the authority of the UNSC, especially when it refrains from taking decisions
related to international peace and security, whether the authority is the UNGA or a coalition of

250 Ibid at para 54.
251 Ibid at para 61.
252 Ibid.
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willing states outside the authority of the UNSC. The international community has to take its
responsibility to end the grave genocides and people’s suffering, and it can’t leave the decision to
one authority. The R2P doctrine is a step toward achieving the goal of ending the genocides and
suffering. However, it is important for any emerging norm to be consistent with the principles of
international law or otherwise it is likely to be accused of illegitimacy, as is the case with the
R2P, which received a lot of criticism because of its incompatibility with some well-established
norms in international law, as will be discussed broadly in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Humanitarian Intervention
“Humanitarian intervention saves lives and costs lives. It upholds international law and sometimes breaks
international law. It prevents Human rights violations and it perpetrates them.”253

In light of the conclusions drawn in the previous chapter, the R2P doctrine is applicable
in the case of Syria. The international community could intervene to break the deadlock and
solve the humanitarian crisis using the R2P doctrine, which, as discussed above, may in extreme
cases lead to the use of force in order to save lives and avoid violations of human rights
guaranteed in the Charter of the United Nations.254 This kind of military intervention is often
described as humanitarian intervention. Scholars are divided around the legality of humanitarian
intervention. On the one hand, it complies with the main purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations, which emerged after World War II in 1945, to protect human rights and guarantee
international peace and security,255 a fact that motivates some scholars, just like Michael Walzer,
to argue that humanitarian intervention is legitimate, given its moral duty toward humanity. On
the other hand, the Charter prohibits the use of force between states, aside from where certain
exceptions exist, and holds the responsibility to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to
deal with any act of aggression and maintain international peace and security.256 Humanitarian
intervention is occasionally operated by a state or a coalition of states across the borders of or
within the territory of other state with the aim of saving the lives of the targeted state’s citizens.
253 David Vesel, “The Lonely Pragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imperfect World” (2003) 18:1 BYUJ Pub L 1 at 1.
254 Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations, states that the purpose of the United Nations is promoting and encouraging “respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” UN Charter, supra note 14.
255 The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations states, “We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” UN Charter, supra note 14.
256 UN Charter, supra note 14.
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Moreover, humanitarian intervention raises the question of state sovereignty. The principle of
state sovereignty is well established in the Charter of the United Nation, which ban states to
interfere in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any another state in the
international community.257 This is why scholars argue the legality of the humanitarian
intervention; and call it the dilemma.258 Humanitarian intervention is “one of the most
controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade – both when intervention has happened, as
in Kosovo, and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda.”259
This chapter presents the “dilemma” around the issue of humanitarian intervention. It
discusses the legal position of humanitarian intervention in international law and then argues for
the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Finally, the thesis question – “Does the international
community have a responsibility to protect Syrian citizens” – will be addressed. Therefore, the
chapter explores these points in the following sections:
 What is Humanitarian Intervention?
 The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention in International Law.
 Is There a Legal Duty to Intervene?

4.1 What is Humanitarian Intervention?
Humanitarian intervention was defined by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) as “the non-consensual use of outside military force on humanitarian
grounds.”260 Where the term “humanitarian” refers to “the threat or actual occurrence of large

257 Ibid.
258 Enabulele, supra note 24 at 413.
259 ICISS, supra note 4 at VII.
260 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background:
Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa, ON: International
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scale loss of life (especially genocide), massive forced migration, and widespread abuses of
human rights; it does not, however, include the overthrow of a democratically elected
government, unless one of the results is large scale loss of life,”261 which is what is happening in
the case of Syria, considering the huge numbers of people killed.
The term, therefore, refers to the use of force to save the lives of citizens; hence, this
definition is different from the traditional understanding of military intervention because
humanitarian intervention encompasses different aspects, for example, legal, political, and
ethical. J. L. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane define humanitarian intervention as “the threat or use
of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending
widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its
own citizens, without the permission of the State within whose territory force is applied.”262 Sean
D. Murphy describes it as “the threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international
organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from
widespread deprivation of internationally organized human rights.”263 The idea of humanitarian
intervention takes a prominent position in the scholarly debates. Ian Hurd reflects that the
principle “evolved as a subset of the laws governing the use of force and has very quickly come
to occupy an institutional position alongside self-defence and Security Council authorization as a
legal and legitimate reason for war. It is both widely accepted and yet still highly

Development Research Centre, 2001) at 79, online: <http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/ICISS1201supplement.pdf> [ICISS, “Supplementary
Volume”].
261 Ibid at 79
262 Holzgrefe & Keohane, supra note 10 at 18.
263 Sean D Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1996) at 11.
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controversial.”264 Maybe that is why the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) issued the
guiding principles of humanitarian intervention that were echoed in its resolution A/RES/46/182,
dated December 19, 1991,265 and resolution A/RES/58/114 dated February 5, 2004,266 which
affirmed that humanitarian intervention “must be provided in accordance with the principles of
humanity, neutrality, and impartiality.”267

4.2 The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention in International law
The legality of the humanitarian intervention is called into question because of its direct
conflict with two well-established principles in international law. That is why, as in many other
legal issues, there is no definite answer to the question of its legality. Scholars look at the issue
from different perspectives, which will be discussed in this section, but before delving into the
legality of humanitarian intervention in international law, it is important to define the
components that constitute international law. This understanding will facilitate the discussion, for
example, why the UN Charter is always referred to when discussing the legality of humanitarian
intervention, as well as the discussion about the position of customary law in international law.
International law is a combination of many sources. The International Court of Justice
(ICJ), which is acknowledged as an authoritative source of international law, has categorized
these sources in Article 38, Para 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as follows:

264 Ian Hurd, “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World” (2011) 25:3 Ethics & Intl Affairs 293 at 293
[Hurd].
265 UNGA, Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations, 78th Plen Mtg, UN Doc
A/RES/46/182, December 1991 para 1, online <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm> [mimeo].
266 UNGA, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United
Nations, 58th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/58/114, (February 2004) at para 1, online: <http://www.preventionweb.net/files/resolutions/N0350142.pdf>
[mimeo].
267 Ibid.
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a.
b.
c.
d.
However,

International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law. 268
scholars of international law consider the “general principles of law”, the “judicial

decisions”, and the “juristic writings” are third in the hierarchy of international law sources, after
the first two sources of “international conventions” and “international custom.” The first two
sources, however, have equal validity so “a treaty can override pre-existing custom, but
subsequent custom can override a treaty.”269
The fundamental international convention that needs to be considered when talking about
humanitarian intervention is the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter was established in
1945 with the consent of all states that agreed to make the world a better place after the atrocities
of World War II. Professor Michael Mandel describes the Charter as the “World’s constitution.
By the consent of all the signatories.”270 In this context, Mandel argues that the Charter binds the
government “notwithstanding any laws or treaties they may have made to the contrary. It has a
supreme legislative institution in the Security Council that is authorized by all of the states to
enforce its decrees on governments and their peoples by the use of coercive measures.”271
Therefore it is considered as the reference to any international action. Humanitarian intervention
is inconsistent with two well-established principles in the Charter: the prohibition of the use of
force and the principle of state sovereignty. These two principles are the main problematic issues

268 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 24 October, 1945, 832 U.S.T.D.993 [ICJ]. See e.g: Holzgrefe & Keohane, supra note 10 at 36.
269 Michael Akehurst, “The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law” (1975) 47:1 Brit YB Intl L 273 at 297.
270 Michael Mandel, “R2P & ICC v. UNC: The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court versus the Charter of the United
Nations” in Enrico Caterini et al, eds, Constituzione, Economia, Globalizzazione: liber amicorum in onore di Carlo Amirante (Napoli: Edizioni
Scientifiche Italiane, 2013) at 1379.
271 Ibid.
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in the question of the legality of humanitarian intervention, which will be discussed hereafter to
find out the position of humanitarian intervention in international law.

The Prohibition of the Use of Force
The Charter of the United Nations has established a normative framework that guides the
use of force in the relations between states. Article 2(4) of the Charter states the general
prohibition on the use of force. It declares that:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.272
However, the Charter includes two exceptions that may be considered in very extreme cases
where the use of force is an option. The first exception is the case of self-defence that falls under
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which declares that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations.273
However, Article 51 also provides that the self-defending state has to use reasonable force to
protect its territory and not exaggerate its position when using this right. The second exception
falls under the Security Council authorization defined in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations. Article 39 provides that:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 274

272 UN Charter, Article 2(4), supra note 14. In the R2P context, see e.g. Chesterman, supra note 14 at 47.
273 Ibid, Article 51. In the R2P context, see e.g. Chesterman, supra note 14 at 53
274 Ibid, Article 39. In the R2P context, see e.g. Chesterman, supra note 14 at 114.
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Taking into consideration that the Charter requires the UNSC to take the necessary peaceful
measures before any decision for use of force, any such measure could be a “complete or partial
interruption of economic relations … and the severance of diplomatic relations.”275 If these
measures are inadequate, then coercive measures can be taken, and they include using military
operations as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 276
These two exceptions, however, do not include or exclude humanitarian intervention.
That is why the legal position of humanitarian intervention remains ambiguous and controversial
among scholars. Petra Perisic argues that “although there is no explicit ban of the humanitarian
intervention in the Charter, it has not been provided among the exceptions to the use of force
either. That is why humanitarian interventions have mainly been considered illegal.”277 Perisic,
explains that “there are contentions that humanitarian interventions are not necessarily contrary
to the Charter…The proponents of humanitarian intervention allege that such interventions are
directed neither against territorial sovereignty nor against political independence of any state.
Also, they claim that humanitarian interventions are consistent with the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.”278 Simon Chesterman suggests that “in order to establish that a right of
humanitarian intervention is compatible with the terms of the Charter, it is necessary to show that
it would not violate Article 2(4).”279 Chesterman explains that “on reading Article 2(4), it is not

275 Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations states that “the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” UN Charter, supra note 14.
276 Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations states, “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
of the United Nations.” UN Charter, supra note 14.
277 Perisic, supra note 15 at 41.
278 Ibid.
279 Chesterman, supra note 14 at 48.
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immediately clear whether the phrase ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence’
is intended to qualify the words ‘treat or use of force’… it might be argued that this is the only
type of force that is to be prohibited.”280 Therefore, Chesterman explains that “reference to the
travaux préparatoires makes it clear, however, that there was no intention for the words to
restrict the scope of the prohibition of the use of force.”281 The words were added, as per
Chesterman, “in response to the desire of several smaller states to emphasize the protection of
territorial integrity and political independence. The possibility for the phrase being interpreted
differently was raised…with the latter suggesting deletion of the words.”282 Therefore, the words
added to confirm the prohibition of use of force, but the Charter, as well, commits United
Nations members to act in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations. The Charter
affirms in its preamble that:
We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war.283
This means that the core principle and mission of the Charter is to prevent humanitarian
catastrophe and to avert abuses of human rights. Humanitarian intervention, if viewed from the
humanitarian perspective, could fulfil this mission. From a different perspective, some scholars
believe that the use of force is prohibition because it affects the international peace and security.
Perisic argues that the phrase, “or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations,” in Article 2(4) “did not seem to have been intended to limit the scope of the
prohibition of the use of force, but to emphasize that any force which is directed against
principles and purposes of the United Nations, among which the maintenance of peace and
280 Ibid at 48.
281 Ibid at 49.
282 Ibid.
283 UN Charter, preamble, supra note 14.
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security is the most important one, is forbidden.”284 Moreover, Perisic explains that “If one
should have to decide on the primacy of principles promulgated by the Charter, deciding on
peace and security on one side and the protection of human rights on the other side, it seems that
priority should be given to the former.”285 Perisic argues that “[t]he analysis of the Charter text,
as well as the primary intention of its adoption, suggest that peace is the highest value
promulgated by the Charter.”286 Anthea Roberts also believes that “the first purpose of the UN
listed in Art[icle] 1 is ‘to maintain international peace and security’ and it appears doubtful that
the drafters regarded human rights as equal in importance to peace. Hence, unilateral uses of
force are not illegal because they breach a technical rule; they are illegal because they breach a
fundamental Charter obligation.”287 However, the failure to guarantee human rights is, in the
opinion of some scholars, a cause of threats to peace and security. Ann Orford notes in her book,
Reading Humanitarian Intervention, that the role of international law and the UNSC after the
Cold War has evolved. Orford believes that “although the jurisdiction of the Security Council …
is only triggered by the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of
aggression, the Security Council has, since 1989, proven itself increasingly willing to interpret
the phrase ‘threats to the peace’ broadly.”288 To prove her point of view, Orford argues that
many different resolutions passed by the UNSC in relation to Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda,
Haiti, and many other countries, show that the UNSC is “willing to treat the failure to guarantee
democracy or human rights, or to protect against humanitarian abuse, as either a symptom, or a
284 Perisic, supra note 15 at 42.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
287 Anthea Roberts, “Legality vs Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force be Illegal but Justified?” in Philip Alston & Euan Macdonald, eds, Human
Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 185,
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cause of threats to peace and security.”289 Because of that, she explains how scholars in
international law react “in favour of Security Council action based on the doctrine of ‘collective
humanitarian intervention,’”290 which has become necessary to address many threats in the postCold War era. When discussing the “collective humanitarian intervention,”291 Orford believes
that “there is now a significant and influential literature arguing that … norms governing
intervention should be, or have been, altered to allow collective humanitarian intervention.”292
Orford argues that such action could be through multilateral intervention or regional
organizations and sometimes even without authorization by the UNSC, as happened in 1999, in
the case of NATO intervention in Kosovo, which was arguably “outside the law.”293 To support
her argument, Orford concludes, “there is a new trend nowadays; some scholars are arguing that
commitment to justice justifies the illegality of humanitarian intervention.”294
There are contradictory interpretations of the Articles of the Charter of the United
Nations, which are reflected by Holzgrefe and Keohane, who divide the debates around the
legality of the humanitarian intervention and international law between holders of two different
opinions. First are the legal positivists who argue that there is moral duty to obey the law … for
them the matters end here.295 The second set of opinions come from “a small group, but growing
number of scholars, who advance the arguments aimed at reconciling humanitarian
intervention,”296 and whose arguments can be divided into three different positions. Some argue
that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter “does not forbid the threat or use of force … it forbids it only
289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid at 4.
293 Ibid.
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295 Holzgrefe & Keohane, supra note 10 at 36.
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when directly against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”; they argue
that “the drafters of the Charter clearly intended the phrase ‘territorial integrity or political
independence of any state’ to reinforce, rather than restrict, the ban of the use of force in
international relations.”297 Those holding second set of opinions believe that “if the Security
Council fails to end massive human rights violations, states may do so without authorization.”298
The third group, though, debate the legality of humanitarian intervention “through an expansive
interpretation”299 of Article 39 of the UN Charter. They argue that the Charter gives “the Security
Council jurisdiction over any ‘threat to the peace’ rather than over any threat to international
peace, [and] permits it to intervene to end human rights violation that lack trans-boundary
effects.”300 There is no doubt that the need for legal standards to govern humanitarian
intervention in cases of serious violation of human rights, and the absence of these standards, has
made commenters provide different interpretations of international law.

The position of international law from humanitarian intervention is not really clear, and
there is not enough evidence to support any of the arguments. In Chesterman’s opinion “the
various attempts to justify a right of intervention considered here are, for the foreseeable future,
unlikely to receive the support of more than a handful of states. As such, humanitarian
intervention will remain at most in a legal penumbra—sometimes given legitimacy by the
Security Council, sometimes merely tolerated by states.”301 Therefore, there was no definite
answer to the ban of use of force for humanitarian purposes, the legal situation of humanitarian

297 Ibid at 37–38.
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intervention under article 2(4) remain ambiguous. Let’s next look at the second principle in
international law that raises debates around the legality of humanitarian intervention.
State Sovereignty
The second principle in international law that is debatable in relation to the legality of
humanitarian intervention is the principle of state sovereignty. “On the international level,
sovereignty means independence, i.e., non-interference by external powers in the internal affairs
of another state. International norms are based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
independent states; international law excludes interference and establishes universally accepted
rules.”302 The Charter outlaws forcible intervention and maintains equal sovereignty for all states
in international community. Article 2(1) stipulates that “the organization is based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”303 In addition, Article 2(7) specifies that:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter Vll.304
In addition, the principle of state sovereignty was echoed in the UNGA resolution 2625, dated
October 24, 1970. It gives all states equal sovereignty, and declares:
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal
members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an
economic, social, political or other nature.
In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
a. States are judicially equal;
b. Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
c. Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;
d. The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are inviolable;
302 Benoist, supra note 22 at 100.
303 Charter, supra note 14. See e.g. Chesterman, supra note 14 at 91.
304 Ibid.
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e.
f.

Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems;
Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international
obligations and to live in peace with other States.305

While it would be conceivable that the preceding Articles give a state absolute right of
sovereignty within its territory, there are important limits to that right. One of these limits is
international peace and security. ICISS notes “the tension between the sovereignty,
independence, and equality of individual states, on the one hand, and collective international
obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security, on the other.” 306 ICISS
explains that for “Chapter VII, sovereignty is not a barrier to action taken by the Security
Council as part of measures in response to ‘a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act
of aggression.”307 Therefore, the sovereignty of states, as recognized in the UN Charter, yields to
the demands of international peace and security. And the status of sovereign equality only holds
effectively for each state when there is stability, peace, and order among states.”308
The other limit to state sovereignty is that “sovereignty may be limited by customary and
treaty obligations in international relations and law. States are legally responsible for the
performance of their international obligations, and state sovereignty therefore cannot be an
excuse for their non-performance.”309 Thus, ICISS explains, the expected obligations “by states
by virtue of their membership in the UN and the corresponding powers of the world organization
presuppose a restriction of the sovereignty of member states to the extent of their obligations

305 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, UNGAOR, 25th Sess, Annex, Agenda Item 85, UN Doc A/RES/25/2625 (1970), online: <http://www.undocuments.net/a25r2625.htm>.
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under the Charter.”310 Furthermore, Article 2(2) confirms that “[a]ll Members, in order to ensure
to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”311 Hence, the Article
commits member states “to achiev[ing] international cooperation in solving problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all.”312 Therefore, “the Charter elevates the
solution of economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, as well as human rights, to the
international sphere. By definition, these matters cannot be said to be exclusively domestic, and
solutions cannot be located exclusively within the sovereignty of states.”313 Sovereignty, then, is
a responsibility of the state. However, “[t]he quality and range of responsibilities for governance
have brought about significant changes in state sovereignty since 1945. In particular, since the
signing of the UN Charter, there has been an expanding network of obligations in the field of
human rights.”314 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948315 is well known. In
addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
two additional Protocols of 1977316 are considered as foundations of international humanitarian
law and all affirm the protection of fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of the
human person, and equal rights of men and women, prohibit torture, and prohibit
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discrimination.317 Therefore, a state is committed to provide these rights to its citizens, and its
sovereignty is only protected if it fulfils this target. Simon Chesterman, a staunch critic to
humanitarian intervention, admits that there are limits to such a principle. “Governments are no
longer completely shielded by principles of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction when they
engage in egregious violations of human rights or otherwise expose their populations to
widespread or systematic abuse.”318 Although Chesterman suggests that interveners are “also
subject to constraints of a legal character…the constraints on forcible means do not demand that
a concerned international community sit on its hands in the face of great human suffering, only
that its response must be limited to peaceful means unless one of these institutions applies.”319
Sovereignty is responsibility and cannot be a privilege for tyrannical states. Martti Koskenniemi,
for instance, views sovereignty as an “organized hypocrisy,” and argues “sovereignty ought not
to shield tyrannical governments. We respect it if it brings us valuable objectives—security,
welfare, human rights.”320 Koskenniemi claims that if “sovereignty were to endanger these, …
why respect it.”321 Christopher Greenwood draws our attention to the main purpose behind the
establishment of the UN Charter, claiming that “[i]t is important to remember that international
law in general and the United Nations Charter in particular do not rest exclusively on the
principles of non-intervention and respect for the sovereignty of the State. The values on which
the international legal system rests also include respect for human rights and ‘the dignity and
worth of the human person.’”322 Greenwood stresses that human rights conventions have
developed continually since 1945, especially the Genocide Convention and the International
317 Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 315. See.e g. Greenwood, supra note 20 at 153.
318 Chesterman, supra note 14 at 110.
319 Ibid.
320 Koskenniemi, supra note 23 at 61, 63.
321 Ibid at 63.
322 Greenwood, supra note 20 at 161.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1948. These developments have “reached the point where
the treatment by a State of its own population can no longer be regarded as an internal matter.”323
The view was accepted by Holzgrefe and Keohane, who view “[t]he UN Charter’s apparent ban
on unauthorised humanitarian intervention does not mean that states are free to treat their own
citizens as they wish. To the contrary, most states are signatories to conventions that legally
oblige them to respect the human rights of their citizens.”324
The argument of whether state sovereignty is more important than human rights was
called by A. O. Enabulele “the dilemma,” and further asks if the principle of state sovereignty
can exist side by side with humanitarian intervention in the same normative order. Enabulele
argues that each of the two principles “carry with it some insidious evil”325 and will not work
alongside “without sacrificing one for the other … [A] State can hide under the absolute
territorial sovereignty principle to unleash mayhem upon its citizens in gross violations of a
treaty or customary law obligations as much as humanitarian intervention can be used by
powerful States to alter the political structure and international alliances of weaker States.” 326 In
Enabulele’s opinion, “the choice is not one that should be made on the basis of sentiments but on
the basis of law.”327 In his view, the “humanitarian intervention is more of politics and material
self interest than of law and humanity.”328 I think that Simon Chesterman tries to shape the
argument with his comment that “closer analysis shows that the doctrinal and historical basis for
such a right is shaky indeed. None of the arguments that humanitarian intervention is compatible
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with Article 2(4) is persuasive.”329 It is actually ambiguous and there is not enough evidence to
support any of side of the argument. However, it seems that there is a tendency toward change in
international law, or at least modifying it to cope with the variables in the international arena. It
has been now 69 years since the Charter was established. Throughout these years, there have
been genocides around the world, resulting in an evolution in the understanding of human rights
and the importance of their superiority over the absolute power of states. I believe the time has
come to consider some amendments in international law to maintain harmonization between the
two rights, the sovereignty and the fundamental human rights.
Customary International Law
Customary law is the second source of international law, and is often considered as one of
the debatable justifications for the legality of humanitarian intervention. Based on Article 38(1)
of the International Court of Justice Statute (ICJ), which states in paragraph (b) that it shall apply
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,”330 in order to consider
a practice as rule in customary law, two components must be satisfied. Perisic explains that:
“there has to be a widespread and systematic practice and there has to be opinio juris, that is, the
belief in the legally binding nature of such practice. In determining whether a customary rule to
humanitarian intervention exists, both elements have to be examined.”331
States have operated many interventions in recent history. The ICISS’s supplement report
provides an overview of the different interventions that have materialized from 1945 until the
end of the Cold War. The report considers three prominent cases (out of ten) that are “often

329 Chesterman, supra note 14 at 87.
330 ICJ, supra note 268.
331 Perisic, supra note 15 at 44.
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invoked as evidence of the norm of humanitarian intervention.332” These cases are: (1) India’s
intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, (2) Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978, and (3)
Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 1970. In the three cases, the report argues the interventions
“were carried out by single states that justified them on grounds of self-defence.”333 Nonetheless,
the report states that most of the commentators who argue that the norm of humanitarian
intervention does not exist assume “that the promotion of an international regime of
humanitarian intervention would give interveners a legal pretext [have ignored] one fact. Strong
states which are – for reasons good or bad – determined to intervene in a weak state have no
shortage of legal rationalizations for their actions.”334
After the Cold War in the 1990s, a number of interventions took place; some with the
authorization of the UNSC and others without it through a state or coalition of states. The
following table lists the most prominent interventions that occurred after 1990, and shows if the
intervention was with or without the UNSC authorization.
Military Interventions since 1990335
Country
Libya
2011– to date
Côte d’Ivoire
2011 to date
Liberia
1990–1997
Northern Iraq
1991–to date
Former Yugoslavia
1992–to date
Somalia
1992–1993
Rwanda

Chapter VII
Authorization and UN
Mission

Chapter VII
Authorization Delegated

No Initial UNSC
Authorization

NATO
UNOCI
ECOMOG
Coalition
UNPROFOR

IFOR and SFOR

UNOSOM II

UNITAF

UNAMIR II

Opération Turquoise

Coalition

332 ICISS, “Supplementary Volume”, supra note 260 at 47 (Kindly note that the first two cases of Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, was added to the
original chart that was created by the ICISS at the Supplementary Volume ).
333 Ibid.
334 Ibid at 67.
335 ICISS, “Supplementary Volume”, supra note 26160 at 80.
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1994–1996
Haiti
1994–1997
Sierra Leone
1997–to date
Kosovo
1999–to date
East Timor
1999–to date

UNMH

MNF

UNAMSIL

ECOMOG
NATO

UNAMET

KFOR
INTERFET

ECOMOG; IFOR: Implementation Force; INTERFET: International Force in East Timor; KFOR: Kosovo Force; MNF:
Multinational Force; NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SFOR: Stabilization Force; UNAMET: UN Mission in East
Timor; UNAMIR: UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda; UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone; UNITAF: Unified Task Force;
UNMH: UN Mission in Haiti; UNOSOM: UN Operation in Somalia; UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force; UNOCI: United
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

The ICISS report notes that “[d]uring this period, the balance in the UN Charter between
state sovereignty and human rights has been tipped so that the latter occasionally assumes the
same or more importance than the claims of states.”336 Hence, the understanding of the concept
of humanitarian intervention became diffused after the 1990s and convinced some commentators
that such repetitive practices could constitute an emerging norm in the customary international
law. Laws develop with the times to make new rules that are commensurate with the
requirements of the new era. Greenwood, argues that “international law is not confined to treaty
texts. It includes customary international law. That law is not static but develops through a
process of state practice, of actions and the reaction to those actions. Since 1945, that process has
seen a growing importance attached to the preservation of human rights.”337 If law develops over
time, why not amend it to better serve us. Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter advise an
amendment to the existing rules and state: “We are operating under a set of rules governing the
use of force that were framed for a very different world, one of sovereign states, conventional

336 Ibid at 48.
337 Greenwood, supra note 20 at 162.
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armies, and noninterference in a government’s treatment of its own citizens. These rules can
continue to serve us well only if they are revised and updated to meet a new set of threats.”338
Ian Hurd discusses the matter from a moderate perspective. He asks an important
question: “If states contradict established international law, does this change the law or is it a
simple case of noncompliance (or can it be both)? Does the practice of humanitarian intervention
(if it exists) sustain the legality of humanitarian intervention?”339 Hurd argues that there is “no
consensus over the legality of intervention, in part because there is no consensus over the sources
of international law more generally. The intervention problem is inseparable from questions that
have been at the heart of international law for centuries, and that we cannot expect to be
answered in order to reconcile the different views on humanitarian intervention.”340 Hurd gives
an uncertain answer to the question of whether humanitarian intervention can be considered as a
norm in customary international law: “[H]umanitarian intervention appears to contradict the
United Nations Charter, but developments in state practice since 1945 might have made it legal
under certain circumstances;”341 and Hurd suggests that whether “humanitarian intervention is
either legal or illegal depend[s] on one’s understanding of how international law is constructed,
changed, and represented. Since these questions cannot be answered definitively, the uncertainty
remains

fundamental,

and

the

legality of

humanitarian

intervention

is

essentially

indeterminate.”342
Chesterman, from his perspective, does not see that humanitarian intervention can be
justified based on states’ previous practices, and argues that “the scope for modification of its
338 Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A Duty to Prevent” (2004) 83:1 Foreign Affairs 136 at 150 [Feinstein & Slaughter].
339 Hurd, supra note 264 at 311.
340 Ibid.
341 Ibid at 293.
342 Ibid.
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provisions through custom is narrow.”343 Chesterman further challenges the suggestion of some
scholars that previous practices of states in humanitarian interventions constitute a customary
norm, by saying that it “lack[s] the necessary opinio juris that might transform the exception into
the rule.”344 Chesterman considers “[t]he various attempts to justify a right of intervention
considered here are, for the foreseeable future, unlikely to receive the support of more than a
handful of states. As such, humanitarian intervention will remain at most in a legal penumbra—
sometimes given legitimacy by the Security Council, sometimes merely tolerated by states.”345
A. O. Enabulele shares Chesterman’s vision, believing that the repetition of the illegal
intervention can’t make it legal, and arguing that the illegality appears from the “trail of
criticisms and condemnation that usually follows the invasion of the territorial sovereignty of
another State and the different motives for which interventions have occurred portray the
practice as very distasteful to States and international law publicists.”346 This is why Enabulele
states that the illegal interventions can’t constitute a norm in customary law; for him “[t]he very
fact of intervening in the internal affairs of the target State without its consent, makes the
intervention unacceptable to, and not binding on, the target State and her sovereign sympathisers
in line with the time-honoured principle that no State can be bound by a custom, the existence of
which it objects.”347 When discussing if humanitarian intervention could be considered as an
opinio juris, a legally obliged conduct, A. O. Enabulele makes an assumption considering the
condition of repetitive state intervention practice fulfilled. He questions, “[C]an it be said that
such practices were followed with opinio juris? … If they do, why do States pick and choose the

343 Chesterman, supra note 14 at 87.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Enabulele, supra note 24 at 414.
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humanitarian violations that they would intervene in? Why should there be intervention in
Bosnia and not in Darfur or in Rwanda, where 800,000 civilians were slaughtered?”348 A. O.
Enabulele categorically affirms that:
[T]he decision to intervene in one country and not the other underscores the
material self interest motivation for humanitarian intervention. If indeed
humanitarian intervention, as claimed, is on the basis of humanity, an obligation,
then humanity should be the basis of non-discriminatory intervention, except some
nationals are more human than others. If it was obligatory, then non-intervention by
States whenever there is gross violation of human rights will constitute a breach of
a rule of customary international law. In the absence of such obligation, we cannot
truly talk about the emergence of a rule.349
I agree with Enabulele that, from a purely legal perspective, law does not emerge based
on ambiguous actions. The repetitions of illegal action will not make it legal, and we can’t build
a norm in customary law based on the illegal previous actions of the states even if the actions are
constantly repeated in different incidents, let alone the uncertainty of the motive of intervention
and pick-and-choose process that was used in many interventions. Furthermore, breaching state
sovereignty is unacceptable in both international law and international relations. States have to
respect each other’s sovereignty. In my opinion, what is needed today is a modification in
international law itself, as the current rules appear to be inadequate to fulfil the new requirements
of this century. Innocent citizens cannot wait for the mercy of the UNSC. Unfortunately, the
recent behaviour of the five permanent members of the UNSC in relation to the crisis in Syria
shows their willingness to interpret the law to fulfil their own interests, as I will explain in
Chapter 5. That behaviour does not show that they understand what they should do in their
capacity as the world’s leaders to avoid genocides and mass atrocity crimes. The idea of allowing

348 Ibid. at 416.
349 Ibid.
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five countries to control the world seems odd in itself. Humans create the law, not the other way
around, although law shapes humankind’s behaviour.
Finally, I would like to refer to Enabulele’s proposal for two approaches to solve the
humanitarian intervention “dilemma.” The proposal gives alternatives to the sole authority of the
UNSC, and suggests that:
1. The power to act in the event of a breach of the peace, should be removed
from the Security Council and located in the General Assembly exercisable
by a two-thirds majority;
2. If the power must be retained by the Security Council, it must be exercisable
by a two-thirds majority while the right of veto is removed.350

In cases such as Syria, when two out of five permanent members stopped a resolution to
halt a humanitarian crisis, it is worth thinking of alternatives. Reconsidering the veto mechanism
at the UNSC, or otherwise replacing its authority with a certain percentage of the UNGA will
motivate states to let the rule of law prevail over their own interests. If a case like Syria is
repeated – and just during my writing of this thesis I have witnessed Ukraine, Iraq, and recently
Palestine – and if the international community remains with no solutions to such cases, the rule
of international law will be endangered.

4.3 Is There a Moral Duty to Intervene?
The question that this section discusses is: If humanitarian intervention is illegal, or at the
best ambiguous, and if state authorities continue to disrespect internationally accepted human
rights in their relations with their own citizens, resulting crimes against the humanity within the
state and instability will affect international peace and security. Does the international

350 Ibid at 420.
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community have a moral duty to intervene, and can the reasons of protecting human rights and
human security legitimize the intervention?
The widely accepted debate between scholars, as discussed above, is that the main
purpose of creating the United Nations was to protect humanity, based on the pledge made by all
state members in 1945. The international community took the initiative, in the preamble of the
Charter of the United Nations,351 to decide to save the citizens from the scourge of war, to
establish justice, and to respect human rights. Therefore, they affirmed their moral duty to protect
humanity. But the number of interventions that have happened since 1945 lead many to become
skeptical of the notion behind interventions and question their legality, especially when the
interveners execute their interventions for moral and human rights reasons while the intervention
carries colonial ambitions. David Chandler and Thomas Weiss consider the moral duty as just an
excuse for the West to legitimate its invasions. In Chandler’s view, morality as an excuse to
legitimize the intervention is another “[j]ustification for new interventionist norms as a
framework for liberal peace are as dependent on the needs of Realpolitik as was the earlier
doctrine of sovereign equality and non-intervention.”352 Chandler argues that the restriction on
the use of force in international law does not depend only on “the moral legitimacy of
international law but also the balance of power during the Cold War.”353 Chandler believes that
morality is used as an excuse to legitimize the interest of the big states in intervention, such as
the US and its allies, because “while there is little barrier to the assertion of US power around the
world, there is, as yet, no framework which can legitimize and give moral authority to new, more

351 UN Charter, supra note 14.
352 Chandler, supra note 11 at 59.
353 Ibid at 75.
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direct forms of Western regulation.”354 This situation led Chandler to call it “the crisis of a
legitimate framework,”355 which would “appear to be the dynamic driving the convergence of
morality and Realpolitik, whether expressed in the ‘responsibility to protect’ or the ‘war against
terrorism.’”356 Chandler fears that “[t]his crisis has provided the context in which the morallybased ideas of the ‘liberal peace’ could move from being a marginal concern into the
mainstream. The less certainty there is regarding the international legal and political framework
the more morality and ethics have come into play in an attempt to provide the lacking framework
of legitimacy.”357 Chandler concludes that “the assumption that major powers, tasked with
intervening as ‘good international citizens’, will act with higher moral legitimacy than powers
which lack military and economic resources, relies on morality directly correlating with
power.”358 It seems the case that many consider that intervention is not motivated by morality as
much as for political interests. Thomas Weiss expresses a similar opinion and perceives that
those who are “espousing the use of military force for human protection purposes are no longer
on the side of the angels.”359 In an attempt to convince us of his opinion, Weiss emphasizes the
reaction of the developing countries that interpret the Western notion of intervention in their
states as “the world’s most powerful states can break the rules with impunity.”360
From a completely different point of view, Michael Walzer, who presents a different line
of thinking about morality of international relations in his work Just and Unjust Wars, urges that
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid at 76.
359 Weiss, supra note 6 at 748.
360 Ibid.
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“the commitment to state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force in international
relations must give way in situations where those principles hamper the defence of human rights
or self-determination.”361 Anne Orford provides a critical analysis of Walzer’s work on “the
emergence of moralism.”362 Orford argues that Walzer’s model of thinking is relative to the
doctrine of the R2P. “Walzer considers that international law in the age of the United Nations
has become increasingly uninteresting … Walzer thus rejects the legitimacy both of the UN and
of the international law that has come into being in the UN era.”363 In Walzer’s view, “[t]he UN
Charter was supposed to be the constitution of a new world, but, for reasons that have often been
discussed, things have turned out differently. …. [a]nd because the UN sometimes pretends that
it already is what it has barely begun to be, its decrees do not command intellectual or moral
respect.”364 According to Walzer the “moral standing of any particular state depends upon the
reality of the common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that
protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile.”365 Therefore, “the legalist paradigm
exists to protect life, liberty, and the right to self-determination. This requires judging ‘when a
community is in fact self-determining, when it qualifies, so to speak, for non-intervention.’”366
Accordingly, if the state fails to protect its citizens, “it will no longer qualify for the principle of
non-intervention – the defence of such a state will have no moral justification.”367 Walzer
describes a case, similar to the Syrian case, arguing that “where one group within a state is
fighting for secession or national liberation, in situations of civil war where one party is being
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supported by a foreign power, or in cases of massive human rights violations,”368 humanitarian
intervention can be justified in certain circumstances.
Humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response (with reasonable
expectations of success) to acts “that shock the moral conscience of mankind.” The
old-fashioned language seems to me exactly right. It is not the conscience of
political leaders that one refers to in such cases. They have other things to worry
about and may well be required to repress their normal feelings of indignation and
outrage. The reference is to the moral convictions of ordinary men and women,
acquired in the course of everyday activities. And given that one can make a
persuasive argument in terms of those convictions, I don’t think that there is any
moral reason to adopt that posture of passivity that might be called waiting for the
UN (waiting for the universal state, waiting for the messiah).369

Another moral justification for humanitarian intervention to protect people in dire need is
the paradigm of Human Security. “The term has been used by thinkers who have sought to shift
the discourse on security away from its traditional state-centered orientation to the protection and
advancement of individuals within societies.370 The ICISS report asserts that Human Security
“means the security of people - their physical safety, their economic and social well-being,
respect for their dignity and worth as human being, and the protection of their human rights and
fundamental freedom.”371 The Secretary-General of the United Nations has insisted on the
interrelationship between Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect. The UNSC report
A/64/701 dated 8 March 2010 discloses the following:
Human security is based on a fundamental understanding that Governments retain
the primary role for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens. It
is an invaluable tool for assisting Governments in identifying critical and pervasive
threats to the welfare of their people and the stability of their sovereignty. It
advances programmes and policies that counter and address emerging threats in a
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid at 97.
370 S. Neil Macfarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Reviewed by G. John Ikenberry Human security and the UN: A critical history, (Indiana
University Press, 2006).
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manner that is contextually relevant and prioritized. This helps Governments and
the international community to better utilize their resources and to develop
strategies that strengthen the protection and empowerment framework needed for
the assurance of human security and the promotion of peace and stability at every
level — local, national, regional and international.372
Therefore, for those who think that humanitarian intervention is illegal in international law and
stand against it, they “must explain alternatives to victims of genocide in Rwanda or ethnic
cleansing in Darfur.”373
If we assume that humanitarian intervention is not applicable in Syria, then who is
responsible to protect the violation of human rights? The use of force is prohibited because the
norms of international law do not allow humanitarian intervention. International law protects the
sovereignty of the Syrian authorities that are committing mass atrocity crimes against its
civilians. The ongoing crisis is escalating every day. The Syrian crisis not only leads to
instability in the Middle East, but it also affects international peace and security. Many peaceful
attempts by the international community have failed. What is the alternative legal solution for
Syria? Protecting human rights and maintaining human security could be legitimate reasons, I
argue, to justify a humanitarian intervention to stop the crisis. Carsten Stahn was right to argue
that “[t]he Syrian crisis illustrates the struggles of international law to cope with injustices and
violations of legal norms.”374 Stahn challenges “the assumption that the Syria crisis provides a
momentum to reconsider the treatment of the prohibition of the use of force or to postulate a new

372 UNSC, Human security: Report of the Secretary-General, March 2010, UN Doc A/64/701, online:
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373 Arya Neil, “Is military action ever justified? A physician defends the ‘Responsibility to Protect’” (2007) 23 Medicine, Conflict
and Survival 172–188.
374 Carsten Stahn, “Between Law-Breaking and Law-Making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and ‘What the Law Ought to Be’” (2013) 19:1 J
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permissive rule.”375 The Syrian situation provides a good example of the inability of international
law to protect humanity – its rules are inadequate to halt the crisis. Lee Feinstein and AnneMarie Slaughter portray the legal situation by stating that “[w]e live in a world with old rules and
new threats … In the name of protecting state sovereignty, international law traditionally
prohibited states from intervening in one another’s affairs.”376 The authors debate that such
hesitation cannot prevail anymore, that international law is inadequate to respond to the different
threats around the world, and they demonstrate that “members of the human rights and
humanitarian protection communities came to realize that, in light of the humanitarian
catastrophes of the 1990s, from famine to genocide to ethnic cleansing, those principles will not
do.”377 Arguing that “in a world in which governments can get access to the most devastating
weapons and make them available to terrorists, we must take action.”378 They conclude if the
state “is unwilling or unable to halt or avert [harm to its citizens], the principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”379
In my opinion, the international community has a moral duty to protect Syrian citizens. It
is a collective responsibility that all member states of the United Nations have to share. The
norms of international law prohibit the use of force in order to secure international peace and
security, not to stand disabled when human rights are violated. State sovereignty can’t be
protected by the rules of law when the citizens of that state are either dead or displaced. State
sovereignty is respected when the state is able to protect its citizens and respect their humanity
and dignity, not when it detains and kills them. If the international community does not take the
375 Ibid at 27.
376 Feinstein & Slaughter, supra note 338 at 138.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid at 150.
379 Ibid at 141.
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appropriate actions to end the genocide in Syria, the United Nations itself will suffer the disunity
of its members and its existence may be threatened.
In conclusion, I think that international law has to be amended to be able respond to
crises such as the one in Syria. In this context, the responsibility to protect doctrine represents an
attempt toward such amendments. The R2P doctrine still lacks the mechanism for its
implementation. However, all of the debate around it means that it was successful in changing
international law or at least in motivating some to think again that it needs to be amended.
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Chapter 5
The Strategic and Political Situation
The lessons seem all too obvious. When states wish to intervene, they will reach for convenient
humanitarian justifications that extend from genocide to electoral irregularities. When nations wish to
avert their eyes, even millions dying in concentration camps or under the treads of tanks are perceived as
merely local problems to be left to those in charge, often by states which have themselves pleaded the
right of humanitarian intervention in other instances.380

It was concluded in Chapters 3 and 4 that Syria is a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) case
and that the international community has a moral responsibility to stop the genocide and the
grave violation of human rights. Such intervention could break the deadlock in Syria, but
strategic analysis shows, and this chapter discusses, that intervention is unlikely to happen
because of the international strategic situation. This chapter explores how the international
community is divided on what constitutes the best action in regard to the Syrian situation. It will
discuss the interests of each of the strategic actors in the Syrian situation. Finally, it will conclude
by saying that there was always an intervention in Syria regardless of the intervention’s direct
military form.381
The key international actors in relation to the Syrian situation are divided, in general, into
two camps, with Russia, China, and Iran on one side as supporters for the Al-Assad regime, and
the US, Europe, and their allies on the other side. On the actual battleground neither the AlAssad regime nor the armed rebels are able to achieve a complete military victory. The Al-Assad
regime is increasingly well positioned and the political opposition lacks political leadership.
380 Thomas M Franck & Nigel S Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force” (1973) 67 Am J Intl
L275 at 294.
381 Ignatieff, supra note 31.
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There is a kind of strategic equilibrium so that if one side tips it will be the winner in the Syrian
battle. However, because of lack of interest, neither of the two sides is willing to change this
equilibrium and pursue humanitarian intervention.
While many states are involved in the Syrian situation, the following section will analyze
the motive of only three key strategic actors: Russia, China, and the US. The first two were
selected for discussion because they were – four times – the reason why any resolution was
precluded in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The US was selected for discussion
because it threatened the Syrian regime with a military intervention after the use of chemical
weapons incident in 2013. The argument will elaborate some facts that explain the reaction of
each actor and illustrate how politics is at the core of any decision of military intervention.

Russia
Russia’s support for the Al-Assad regime was defined in the first days of the revolution. “[A]t the
global level Russia is the power which has most prominently provided a diplomatic shield for the
Syrian state and bolstered it with arms supplies, although Moscow talks about the need to
‘balance’ between the warring parties in Syria.”382 Russia’s behaviour was notably different from
its behaviour toward other countries of the Arab Spring. It did not, for instance, take the same
position in the case of Libya and Egypt. Mark N Katz, noted that “[t]he Russian government,
though, has taken a more pragmatic attitude. Although the new Egyptian government has been
critical of the Assad regime, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed support for Morsi’s [the
Egyptian president] proposal for the creation of an Egyptian-Iranian-Saudi-Turkish quartet to

382 Roy Allison, “Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis” (2013) 89:4 Intl Affairs 795 at 795. [Allison].
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resolve the Syrian problem.”383 Similar behaviour was practiced by Russia in the Libyan case,
Katz argues that “President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and other high-level Russian
officials have often cited how UN Security Council Resolution 1973 imposing a no-fly zone over
Libya was ‘overstepped’” by the West and its Arab allies to bring about the downfall of the
Qadhafi regime. This is the reason Russia will not agree to even more limited Security Council
sanctions against Assad.”384
In fact, the relationship between Syria and Russia is not new. Many elements can be
listed, starting with Russia’s “de facto alignment”385 with the Syrian regime since 1960,
maintaining the Syrian market as an arms importer,386 and, most importantly, “Russia[’s] …
commitment in Syria [to] construction work on the Arab Gas Pipeline linking Egypt to Turkey,
and it may view Syria as strategically significant for energy transit.”387 Mark Katz argues that
Russia holds the key to resolve the Syrian conflict as its “support for Assad has seriously
damaged Moscow’s ties with the wider Middle East; and … that after the Assad regime falls,
Moscow will no longer have any influence in the Arab world.”388 In support of his argument,
Katz cites the following reasons:
•
•
•

[T]he desire to retain Russia’s naval facility in Syria (the only one Moscow has
outside the former USSR);
[T]he fear that the downfall of Assad will lead to a geopolitical gain for America and a
loss for Russia;
[T]he determination to prevent Syria from becoming “another Libya” (where, in
Moscow’s view, Russia and China allowed passage of a Security Council resolution
that called for the imposition of a no-fly zone that America and its allies then exceeded
the terms of to bring down the [Gaddafi] regime);

383 Mark N Katz, “Russia and the Conflict in Syria: Four Myths” (2013) 20:2 Middle East Policy 38 at 42 [Katz, “Four Myths”].
384 Ibid.
385 Allison, supra note 382 at 795.
386 “No Warplanes for Syria Says Russian Arms Sales Boss”, Ria Novosti (13 February 2013), online:
<http://en.ria.ru/world/20130213/179443688/No-Warplanes-for-Syria-Says-Russian-Arms-Sales-Boss.html>.
387 Allison, supra note 382 at 807.
388 Katz, “Four Myths”, supra note 383 at 38.
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•

[T]he fear that the downfall of Assad will somehow result in increased Muslim
opposition activity inside Russia itself.389

The Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, has affirmed his country’s position on the Syrian crisis
on different occasions. One example is his letter to the American citizens, which reflects Russia’s
view of any Western intervention. He said:
No one wants the United Nations to suffer the fate of the League of Nations, which
collapsed because it lacked real leverage. This is possible if influential countries
bypass the United Nations and take military action without Security Council
authorization.
[…]We are not protecting the Syrian government, but international law. We need to
use the United Nations Security Council and believe that preserving law and order
in today’s complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international
relations from sliding into chaos. The law is still the law, and we must follow it
whether we like it or not. Under current international law, force is permitted only in
self-defense or by the decision of the Security Council. Anything else is
unacceptable under the United Nations Charter and would constitute an act of
aggression.390
This makes it clear that Russia will not allow any intervention in Syria, unless anything
changes in the strategic situation, even if the intervention is for humanitarian purposes.

China
Although China condemns Al-Assad’s brutal actions in many incidents, the Chinese
foreign minister, Wang Yi, said: “China is firmly against the use of chemical weapons and
strongly backs the efforts to seek a political settlement of the Syria chemical arm[s] crisis.”391
Nevertheless, analyses suggest that China’s support to Al-Assad is due to the economic and trade

389 Ibid
390 Vladimir V Putin, “A Plea for Caution From Russia: What Putin Has to Say to Americans About Syria”, Editorial, The New York Times (11
September 2013), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html?ref=opinion&_r=0>.
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relations between the two countries. In 2010, Syria was ranked as the third-largest importer of
Chinese goods. In an analysis, CNN said that “‘Beijing’s renewed interest in Damascus – the
traditional terminus node of the ancient Silk Road ... indicates that China sees Syria as an
important trading hub,’ according to a 2010 report from The Jamestown Foundation, a
Washington-based research and analysis institute.392 However, there is another reasons for China
to support the Al-Assad regime; Christina Lin, a senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic
Relations based at Johns Hopkins University in the US, argues that China has worries about the
extremist parties who exist in China, such as the Uyghur. She explains that “in October 2012,
[…] Chinese press reported that Uyghurs were fighting in Syria alongside Al-Qaeda and other
jihadists against the Assad regime …[and] fears that battle-hardened Chinese jihadists, after
getting their jihadi tickets punched in Syria, would return home to feed local jihadist movements
against the communist government.393 Many scholars debate that China’s motivation to seek to
preclude UNSC resolutions was because of its hard experience in Libya. Yun Sun, a former
visiting fellow with the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution,
suggests that “Beijing’s perception of gaining nothing while losing everything in Libya after
abstaining on UNSCR 1973 significantly contributed to its decision to veto the Syria resolution.
The bitter lesson from its belated and ongoing unstable relationship with the Libyan National
Transitional Council has prompted Beijing to adopt a more sophisticated hedging strategy on

392 Holly Yan, “Syria allies: Why Russia, Iran and China are standing by the regime”, CNN World News (29 August 2013), online:
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/>.
393 Christina Lin, “Why China supports Assad: Asian jihad hits Syria” (14 October 2013), The Transatlantic Academy (blog), online:
<http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/node/611>.
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Syria.”394 Hence, currently, China may feel that having Al-Assad is better than other ambiguous
alternatives, and is less concerned with the suffering of the Syrian people.

United States
America claims that its ideology supports democracy and human rights. The US has
frequently announced its support for Syrians in their revolution against the brutal regime. For
instance, Hillary Clinton, the former secretary of state, commented on US foreign policy, saying:
“[W]e have to stand with those who are working every day to strengthen democratic institutions,
defend universal rights, and drive inclusive economic growth. That will produce more capable
partners and more durable security over the long term.”395
However, the US has been criticized for its hesitation in finding a solution to the Syrian
crisis. Mark Katz argues that the hesitation of “The Obama administration’s policy of nonintervention in Syria has been criticized… for allowing the radical jihadist opposition to grow in
strength vis-à-vis the moderate opposition.”396 Katz explains some of the factors that impact
upon the US decisions in relation to intervention in Syria. One of these factors relates to
“President Obama’s own preferences”397 not to involve US in another war and the:
[Withdrawal of] American forces from Iraq and is in the process of withdrawing them
from Afghanistan. He came to view both of these interventions—initiated by the George
W. Bush administration—as quagmires whose costs far exceeded their benefits. While he
did permit U.S. intervention in the Libyan conflict in 2011, Obama kept this limited.398

394 Yun Sun, “Syria: what China has learned from its Libya experience” (27 February 2012), Washington, D.C. : East-West Center in
Washington, Asia Pacific bulletin; no. 152 at 152.
395 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on the Maghreb in Transition” (Keynote Address delivered at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies: The Maghreb in Transition with Secretary of State Clinton, 12 October 2012), transcript by Federal News Service, online:
<http://csis.org/files/attachments/121012_csis_clinton_transcript_0.pdf>.
396 Mark N Katz, “U.S. Policy Toward Syria: Making the best of a bad Situation”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (October
2013), online: Viewpoints series <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/us_policy_toward_syria_making_best_of_bad_situation.pdf>.
397 Ibid.
398 Ibid.
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In addition to the opposition of both US Congress and the American public to any
intervention in Syria, “Washington does not want to alienate Moscow by intervening in Syria at a
time when it is seeking Russian cooperation on several issues of major importance to the Obama
administration, including the Iranian nuclear file.”399 Fear of jihadists is also a common factor
that the US shares with other states. Katz explains “no government that wants to see the downfall
of Assad wants his regime to be replaced by a radical Sunni jihadist one either. Indeed, this really
is the basic common interest that all governments concerned – whether pro-Assad, anti-Assad, or
neutral – have in Syria.”400 Therefore, as an alternative to humanitarian intervention, the US
administration announced its intention to militarize the Syrian rebels.401 Bernadette Meehan, of
the National Security Council, comments that “the president has made the decision to authorize
additional assistance, but we’re not going into specifics … The president has been very clear that
all options are on the table, with the exception of U.S. troops on the ground. That is not a
possibility.”402
Moreover, in his May 28, 2014, speech, President Obama outlined US foreign policy,
saying that human rights are related to US national security: “America’s support for democracy
and human rights goes beyond idealism – it is a matter of national security.”403 Obama affirmed
the US promotion of international law, saying “what makes us exceptional is not our ability to
flout international norms and the rule of law; it is our willingness to affirm them through our
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actions.”404 In speaking about the Syrian file, Obama said there is no easy answer regarding the
Syrian conflict, and stated:
I will work with the Congress to ramp up support for those in the Syrian opposition
who offer the best alternative to terrorists and brutal dictators. And we will continue
to coordinate with our friends and allies in Europe and the Arab World to push for a
political resolution of this crisis, and to make sure that those countries and not just
the United States are contributing their fair share to support the Syrian people.405
Obama’s declarations make it obvious that the US is not interested in intervening in
Syria. Thus, it seems to be the case that none of the three strategic actors, which were discussed
in this chapter, are interested in operating a military intervention in Syria. The US wants the
rebels to get rid of Al-Assad in an unbalanced battle; Russia wants, above all, to maintain its
strategic position and the Gas Pipes, and China does not want to repeat its failures in Libya and
fears the jihadists. Unless a new element arises to change the balance of the equation in the
battlefield, no humanitarian intervention will happen, even though an intervention could break
the deadlock after the failure of any peaceful solution.
Although, international efforts have failed to militarize a humanitarian intervention, it is
“hardly a failure to intervene”406 – strategic actors intervene in indirect ways in Syria but not to
protect the Syrian citizens. Professor Michael Ignatieff, criticizes the failure to mount a
humanitarian intervention, saying:
[I]t is only too obvious that thus far the [international community has failed] to
protect the people of Syria. This is hardly a failure to intervene: external
intervention has been constant from the beginning. A ferocious, well-armed proxy
war is devouring Syria, with weapons pouring in from all sides. Iran, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, the Gulf States, and Hezbollah have each tried to tip the military
404
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405 Ibid.

406 Ignatieff, supra note 31.
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balance in favor of the regime or the rebels. Far from succeeding, they have
aggravated the atrocities and exposed civilians on every side to repeated, deliberate,
and murderous attack.407
Based on all of the above points, I conclude that humanitarian intervention in Syria is
unlikely to happen because of the strategic and political situation. Unfortunately, Syria is one
example of the weakness of international community when it comes to finding appropriate
solutions to the humanitarian disasters around the world. More effort is required to modify
international law, so that it meets the requirements of the times. What is required from us as
lawyers and scholars in international law is to make sure that the rule of law is prevailed upon,
not the political interests of the parties to any humanitarian disaster, or otherwise the world will
suffer more and more.

407 Ibid.
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Conclusion
This thesis discussed the Syrian crisis since its early days in 2011, and explained the
reasons that allowed the situation in Syria to escalate and transform from a revolution into a civil
war. It explored the deterioration of the humanitarian situation and further discussed the different
attempts taken by the international community to avert the continuous violations of human
rights. However, since no interventions were materialized, these attempts were inadequate to stop
the crisis and to save Syrians from their daily suffering. Therefore, the research questioned the
responsibility of the international community to protect the Syrian citizens from the ongoing
genocides and war crimes. To answer the question, the research introduced the doctrine of the
responsibility to protect. R2P doctrine is an emerging norm in international law and was
presented in the ICISS report in 2001 in response to the grave genocides, such as in Rwanda and
Kosovo. The doctrine, which was endorsed by the world’s leaders at the 2005 World Summit,
implies the responsibility of the state authority to protect its citizens from genocides, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. If the state authority is unable or unwilling to
avert and halt the crisis, then the international community have the responsibility to respond to
collectively stop such crimes.
The research applied the doctrine on the Syrian situation and discussed that the Syrian
authority is not only unable to halt the crisis, but instead, is committing war crimes against its
citizens. Accordingly, the international community have the responsibility to protect the Syrian
citizens and to resolve the Syrian crisis. However, this responsibility may, in extreme cases, lead
to military intervention in order to save lives and avoid violations of human rights. This kind of
intervention was often described as a humanitarian intervention. The research analysed the
legality of humanitarian interventions versus its legitimacy. Humanitarian intervention is
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incompatible with international law, except in the case of two exceptions. The first exception is
in the case of self-defence and the second exception is under the authorisation of the UNSC.
Scholars tried to argue the legality of humanitarian intervention through different interpretations
of international law but could not agree on its legality. However, the research questioned the
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, and suggested that the international community has a
moral duty to protect Syrian citizens. Finally, the research explained that because politics lie at
the core of any intervention, a humanitarian intervention was not materialized in Syria.
The Syrian situation is not the first crisis the World witnessed and will not be the last, and
to be able to deal with future crises, there is a need to develop the norms of international law. It is
doubtful that the Charter of the United Nations will be able to survive with its current rules and
norms. Unless these norms are developed in a way that enables them to effectively respond to
changes in the international arena, we will soon witness its end. It is obvious from state practice,
in particular the more influential states, that they are willing to implement international law
whenever it serves their interests and not when they should do so for moral reasons. This
behaviour will diminish the respect of international law. It is also apparent that the doctrine of
the responsibility to protect, although it needs improvement, is on track to replace or at least
make changes to a number of fundamental principles in international law, (e.g., the use of force
and the principle of state sovereignty). In my opinion, there is a need to replace the existing
norms in international law with unified norms that do not include a pick-and-choose process, and
to create a law that can respond to people’s suffering and respect their humanity.
As for Syria, I think that the most appropriate solution for them now is to work toward
conflict resolution and reconciliation between the warring parties in order to rebuild Syria. This
was expressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, when he addressed
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the issue of the Syrian conflict in his speech on January 22, 2014, saying: “Enough is enough.
The time has come to negotiate.”408 Humanitarian intervention is unlikely to happen in the near
future, unless new factors arise in the strategic political situation. “Wars eventually end. Even the
longest, most brutal, and most destructive conflicts ultimately give way to peace.”409 When their
conflict ends, Syrians will have to build their own pluralistic country based on the principles of
freedom, equality, and dignity. They have to establish a transitional government410 that represents
all parties in the conflict and work together toward post-conflict life in Syria by building a
sustainable peace and ensuring society is governed by the rule of law.

408 “Syria conflict: Ban Ki-moon says ‘enough is enough’”, BBC News (22 January 2014), online: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-25851713>.
409 Steven Heydemann, “The Big Picture - Envisioning a best-possible peace for Syria -- and what it will take to reach it”, United States Institute
of Peace (6 December 2013), online: <http://www.usip.org/publications/the-big-picture>.
410 UNSC, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc S/2004/616,
August 2004, online: <http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf>.
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